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Entrepreneurs face a host of potential choices in creating new firms, yet little is known 
about how multiple institutional actors promoting different practices and technologies 
can affect entrepreneurial decision-making, especially at the beginning of new sectors 
and technological lifecycles. Using historical data and quantitative analyses of U.S. 
biodiesel producer foundings, technological innovation and diversity, I highlight the 
impact of competing institutional actors (agriculture trade associations) on 
entrepreneurial decision-making and activity. I posit that greater competition or 
heterogeneity of trade associations promoting various technologies will result in 
higher rates of biodiesel foundings as well as technological variation and innovation. I 
also analyze the moderating influences of competing institutional actors (Sierra 
Club/environmental lobby actors) and entrepreneurial network relations (captured by 
de novo and de alio entrants) on trade association effectiveness. In a final analysis, I 
explore the moderating influence of institutional actor size on actor heterogeneity. The 
dissertation contributes to the growing nexus of institutions and entrepreneurship 
research as well as to the research on technology entrepreneurship.  
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CHAPTER 1 
 
THEORY AND RESEARCH OVERVIEW 
 
I address two major theoretical and empirical questions in this dissertation: At 
the beginning of new technological sectors, what environmental factors affect 
entrepreneurial decision-making? And, in such contexts, what elements impact new-
venture innovation? Regarding the first question, past research exploring the choices 
of potential or current entrepreneurs usually cast them as highly rational beings that 
develop or adopt technologies and organizational forms based on available 
information such as technological efficiency, lifecycle age, availability and cost of 
resources, market demand, etc. (Schumpeter, 1934; Simon, 1947; Kirzner, 1973; 
Hannan and Freeman, 1977; Blau, 1987; Dunne, Roberts, and Larry, 1988; Evans and 
Jovanovic, 1989; Tushman and Anderson, 1986; Evans, 1989; Hayek, 1949).  
While these studies provide a foundation to understand how entrepreneurs 
make decisions in established sectors, at the beginning of new industries, information 
is often scarce and technologies are unpredictable. In such environments, I propose 
that powerful institutional actors can affect entrepreneurial decision-making by 
creating social structures that shape potential and current entrepreneurs’ choices. By 
promulgating prescriptions that promote new practices and technologies and by 
furnishing information and demonstrations that can enlighten cognitive 
understandings, powerful actors can change the logics—values, beliefs, and 
understandings—held by individuals (Sine, Haveman, and Tobert, 2005; Hargrave and 
Van de Ven, 2006). Consequently, institutional actors can reduce perceived risks 
surrounding certain technologies and organizational forms and encourage 
entrepreneurial action and adoption.  
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Concerning the second question, the literature on technological innovation has 
traditionally overlooked how powerful actors in the environment can foster 
technological innovation, and instead has generally treated the emergence of new 
technologies as isolated exogenous occurrences (Schumpeter, 1934; Tushman and 
Anderson, 1986). While a few scholars have begun to acknowledge the role of 
powerful actors in creating and sponsoring new kinds of technologies and practices 
(Garud, Jain, and Kumaraswamy, 2002; Hargrave and Van de Ven, 2006; Sine and 
Lee, 2009; Hiatt, Sine, and Tolbert, 2009), they have largely focused on one kind of 
actor, promoting a single practice. We know very little about how competing actors 
promoting different practices can affect the emergence of new technologies. I address 
this void by analyzing how competition among institutional actors can foster the 
development of new technologies as well as technological diversity.  
Empirically, I measure new-venture foundings and technological choice, 
diversity, and innovation in the nascent U.S. biodiesel sector. This is an ideal context 
in which to address these questions as the industry largely arose from the actions of 
powerful agriculture trade associations, such as the American Soybean Association 
and National Cottonseed Producers Association, which promoted and sponsored 
varying production technologies. The institutionalization projects they engaged in to 
create new markets in which to sell their farm products as well as the ensuing 
competition among them had remarkable effects on the growth and development of 
the sector. In the following paragraphs, I will highlight some of the findings from the 
project.  
In Chapter 2, I explore how institutional actors (i.e. agricultures trade 
associations) affect entrepreneurial decision-making at the beginning of new markets 
and the factors that can moderate their influence. The results showed that among 
several competing trade associations, greater strength or membership size of a specific 
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trade association promoting technological prescriptions and understandings had a 
positive impact on the rate of biodiesel firms adopting that particular technology. 
Additionally, competition between trade associations and environmental lobby actors 
(Sierra Club members) who opposed certain biodiesel production technologies in a 
state created a blending as well as a magnifying effect on the influence of the trade 
association. When the promoted technologies were incongruent with logics promoted 
by Sierra Club members, a greater presence of Sierra Club actors did not negatively 
affect biodiesel foundings, but entrepreneurs developed new technologies that were in 
harmony with the values and interests of the Sierra Club instead of the technology 
promoted by the trade association. In contrast, when a promoted technology was in 
harmony with the logics of the Sierra Club, the presence of Sierra Club actors had a 
magnifying effect on the influence of the trade association, wherein more 
entrepreneurs founded biodiesel ventures that implemented the promoted technology.  
In the second part of Chapter 2, I measure how entrepreneurial network 
relations can moderate the influence of institutional actors. Empirically, I analyze how 
de novo versus de alio ventures react to the actions of trade associations and the Sierra 
Club. I found that de novo entrants were more susceptible to the promoted 
prescriptions and scripts of institutional actors (both trade associations and Sierra 
Club) than de alio entrants because they generally were more concerned about 
legitimacy and relied more upon resources in the local environment than de alio 
ventures. In sum, the results indicate that competing actors and network relations can 
have significant moderating effects on the influence of focal institutional actors and 
entrepreneurial decision-making. They also show that the development and adoption 
of new technologies occur in environments where actors compete for entrepreneurial 
attention.  
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In Chapter 3, I continue my exploration into the effects of competition among 
institutional actors and analyze how the degree of competition, or organizational 
heterogeneity, among competing actors affects the decision of potential entrepreneurs 
to found a firm, impacts technological diversity, and influence the development of 
innovative recombinatorial technologies. I found that increased competition or 
heterogeneity among agriculture trade associations fostered biodiesel foundings by 
appealing to a broad variety of individual tastes and values. Moreover, the results 
indicated that trade association heterogeneity had a greater effect on new-venture 
foundings than sheer size or strength of the associations involved. In another analysis, 
I found that greater competition as measured by heterogeneity among trade 
associations had a positive effect on technological diversity and that the effect was 
greater than the impact of size or strength of the competing associations. As new 
ventures adopted a variety of promoted technologies, technological variation in a 
given state also increased.  
In the second part of Chapter 3, I explore how greater competition among 
institutional actors affects entrepreneurial innovation. I find that by providing 
entrepreneurs with a wide repertoire of technologies, values, and ideas, greater 
competition among trade associations can lead to the development of innovative 
recombinatorial technologies. When there were many equal voices promoting various 
new technologies, entrepreneurs were more likely to create a technological process 
that combines two or more technologies. And, similar to previous findings, the impact 
of institutional actor competition on recombinatorial technologies was greater than the 
overall size effect of the actors. I also analyzed the interaction between institutional 
actor size and heterogeneity. The results indicated that greater overall size of 
competing trade associations moderately increased state technological diversity as 
well as the effect of trade association competition on entrepreneurs’ decision to found 
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a firm in a new sector and innovate. Thus, competition among institutional actors can 
be a significant factor behind entrepreneurial activity, innovation, and technological 
diversity at the beginning of new sectors. 
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CHAPTER 2 
 
THE EFFECT OF COMPETING INSTITUTIONAL ACTORS AND NETWORK 
RELATIONS ON INSTIUTTIONAL ACTOR INFLUENCE  
 
Introduction 
Over the last decade, organizational scholars have intensified their focus on the 
role of powerful institutional actors such as professional associations or social 
movements in fostering entrepreneurial activities in new sectors (Rao, Morrill, and 
Zald, 2000; Swaminathan and Wade, 2001; Schneiberg, King, and Smith, 2008; 
Weber, Heinze, and DeSoucey, 2008; Hiatt, Sine, and Tolbert, 2009).1
While such studies have enhanced our understanding of how powerful actors 
can facilitate opportunity creation and exploitation, much of the literature on 
institutions and entrepreneurship focuses on one institutional actor promoting a single 
 Often termed 
institutional entrepreneurs (DiMaggio, 1988; Maguire, Hardy, and Lawrence, 2004; 
Greenwood and Suddaby, 2006), these agents consciously seek to alter existing 
institutional arrangements that shape organizations, by legitimating products and 
forms of organizations within a field and lobbying for regulatory changes that provide 
resources or enable/forbid certain activities. In such way, they can create opportunities 
for entrepreneurs to found new organizations such as bureaucratic thrifts, wind-power 
generation plants, and organic certifying agencies (Haveman, Rao, and Paruchuri, 
2007; Sine and Lee, 2009; Lee, 2009).  
                                                 
1 While there are many ways in which scholars have defined institutions and 
institutional actors, in this paper I define institutions as organizational forms, 
components, structures, or technologies that have become taken-for-granted as 
efficacious and necessary (Meyer and Rowan, 1977). I define institutional actors as 
individual or collective actors that promote organizational arrangements or structures 
in an effort to institutionalize them (DiMaggio, 1988; Tolbert and Zucker, 1996).  
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practice and assumes that the activities of such actor affect all entrepreneurs equally. 
Yet, there are often multiple actors, competing with each other, trying to influence 
entrepreneurs simultaneously. This is particularly salient at the beginning of new 
sectors and technological lifecycles where multiple practices and technologies are 
often developed and promoted by varying actors (Tushman and Anderson, 1986; 
Hargrave and Van de Ven, 2006).  What determines new ventures’ responses to the 
potential influence of competing institutional actors? 
Additionally, entrepreneurs are likely to be immersed in a variety of relational 
contexts that may moderate the influence of institutional actors on entrepreneurial 
decision-making depending on the particular groups or individuals they are connected 
to (Emirbayer and Mische, 1998). For instance, Rao, Davis, and Ward (2000) showed 
that publicly traded companies with strong ties to other companies in the NASDAQ 
were less likely to view the NYSE as a more desirable location and were more 
inclined to stay in the NASDAQ. In such cases where multiple institutional actors 
compete and entrepreneurs are embedded in particular relational networks, what are 
the conditions that lead one actor or the other to have greater influence, and how do 
these influences interact?  
I address these questions by looking at entrepreneurial activities in the U.S. 
biodiesel industry, a new sector where technologies are still very much in flux and 
where a variety of institutional actors are actively seeking to influence business 
entrepreneurs’ definitions of the “right” technology. Empirically, I explore how a 
variety of agriculture trade associations promoting specific biodiesel technologies 
related to their industry and an environmental lobbying group can affect the 
technological choices of new entrants in this sector from 1990 through 2008. 
Additionally I analyze how relational networks between new ventures and 
organizations in other sectors can moderate institutional actor influence. I propose 
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ways in which incongruent logics of competing institutional actors and network 
relations can magnify, dampen, and blend the influence of focal institutional actors. 
Biodiesel industry 
The biodiesel sector presents an ideal context in which to study moderating 
effects of competing institutional actors and relational networks on the ability of 
institutional actors to change cognitive and normative understandings. Biodiesel is fuel 
derived from a variety of organic sources for use in compression-ignition (diesel) 
engines. Typical feedstock oil includes soybean and canola oils, beef and pork tallow, 
and fryer oil from restaurants. Once oil is extruded from oil-seed plants, rendered from 
animal carcasses, or siphoned from restaurant grease traps, it undergoes a 
transesterification process in a biodiesel production facility where, through varying 
technologies individualized for each kind of extracted oil, glycerol is removed from 
triacylglycerol (triglyceride) leaving alkyl esters, resulting in a liquid compound that 
has properties similar to petroleum distillates used to power diesel engines. The type 
of fats and oils used as feedstocks determines the type of chemical and mechanical 
process or technological design (Van Gerpen, Pruszko, Clements, Shanks, and Knothe, 
2006). Thus, the technological design used to process, for example, soybeans is 
different from that used to process, for example, poultry fats.2
The technology to make biodiesel came about through a series of 
improvements in soap-making technology and perfected in universities across the 
nation in response to the energy crises of the 1970s. A number of state-based 
agricultural trade associations found out about the research being conducted by 
 
                                                 
2 There is a moderately high retooling cost associated with changing production 
feedstock technologies. On average, biodiesel producers that had the resources to 
change technological designs in order to utilize other kinds of raw materials were 
forced to idle their plants for about a year. Thus, entrepreneurs are highly motivated to 
pick the best production design from the start. 
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academics and began sponsoring their work in order to develop viable technological 
processes that could convert their farm products into biodiesel. Then, using their 
chapter members and resources, they began promoting such technologies. For 
example, the American Soybean Association promoted feedstock technologies that 
utilized soybean oil as a raw material while the U.S. Canola Association endorsed 
technologies that used canola oil. The National Renderers Association drew attention 
to technologies that utilized animal tallow while the National Corn Growers 
Association advocated technologies that employed corn oil as a biodiesel raw material.  
Thus, while all the agriculture associations in this study shared a common 
concern with the biodiesel sector, they promoted varying production technologies 
depending on the industry members they represented. Because all the technologies 
were very new, entrepreneurs could not simply conduct a cost-benefit analysis of 
which technological production process they should adopt. Thus, agriculture trade 
associations promoting the “best” technology likely had a large influence on the 
decision of entrepreneurs to found a firm and to adopt or develop a production 
process.  
Yet, as the budding sector started to take form, other powerful actors already 
present in the institutional environment opposed most of the promoted production 
technologies mentioned above. Environmental movement organizations such as Sierra 
Club and to a lesser extent Friends of the Earth and Greenpeace attacked what they 
defined as intensive agriculture practices to produce the raw materials that were 
transformed into biodiesel and engaged their members to frame, label, and sponsor 
research claiming such production technologies as unsustainable and wrong. As they 
sought to discredit certain technologies through member mobilization, they likely had 
an influence in shaping the values and understandings held in the institutional 
environment, and in turn, affected entrepreneurial decision-making. 
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Institutional Actors and Technological Choice 
Institutional actors can have a profound influence on the technological choice 
of entrepreneurs. At the beginning technological lifecycles the complexity of and 
uncertainty about new technologies, the lack of consensus about the technology’s 
ultimate form or function, and the high amounts of raw data as well as individual 
processing capabilities needed to understand or use the technology can make it 
difficult for entrepreneurs to adopt a particular technology (Weick, 1990). In such 
environments, the presence of institutional actors who can provide information and 
prescriptions may strongly shape the propensity of individuals to found a firm and 
adopt a particular technology (Suchman, 1995).  
Powerful institutional actors can provide information that can change the 
cognitive value and symbolic meaning of technologies into artifacts that entrepreneurs 
can comprehend and assess. As Pinch and Bijker (1984) noted, technology is socially 
constructed and is subject to situational factors and interpretive processes. Thus, by 
“devising ontological frameworks, proposing distinctions, creating typifications, and 
fabricating principles” (Scott and Backman, 1990: 29), institutional actors can help 
new technologies become “part of the objective, structural properties” of the 
institutional environment (Orlikowski, 1992: 406). Another way actors can change 
cognitive beliefs is by conducting repeated demonstrations of the new practice or 
technology. These evaluation routines provide individuals or organizations with tacit 
or inarticulate knowledge of the technology thereby shaping their understanding and 
perception. For example, Garud and Rappa (1994) found that by conducting multiple 
demonstrations and tests of cochlear implant technology, technology developers were 
able to alter the FDA and the public’s belief of the implants safety and usefulness. 
Institutional actors can also shape the propensity of entrepreneurs to adopt an 
uncertain technology by promoting certain values or prescriptions that define what is 
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appropriate. Sometimes, this entails promoting a culture or identity that is conducive 
for the adoption of a particular technology. For example, in the grass-fed meat and 
dairy sector, activists mobilized broad cultural codes to create a collective producer 
identity and a market in which such products could be produced and sold. The 
resulting identities facilitated the exchange between producers and consumers and 
motivated entrepreneurs to enter the new market and adopt the unique agriculture 
technology (Weber, Heinze, and DeSoucey, 2008). Institutional actors can also shape 
normative prescriptions by setting standards (Hargrave and Van de Ven, 2006). For 
example, Lee (2009) found that by starting organic standards-based certifying 
organizations, organic food activists were able to convince existing and new farmers 
to adopt similar growing technologies. More often, however, setting normative 
prescriptions often entails actors propagating principles that explicitly define what is 
right and wrong, by arguing that the technology is scientifically the best practice or 
that it is in the best interest of the adopter or humanity (Scott, 2008). For instance, in 
their study of the emergent wind power sector, Sine and Lee (2009) found that by 
using scientific evidence to  promote the environmentally friendly benefits of wind 
power, environmental activists had a positive impact on the founding of wind power 
producers.  
In the case of the biodiesel industry, state agriculture trade association chapters 
mobilized their members to diffuse information about the biodiesel technology that 
was specific to their agricultural product. They organized agriculture conferences and 
attended county fairs, and other public venues to discuss and demonstrate the new 
technology. Association members bought trucks and tractors, filled them up with 
biodiesel made from their particular agricultural product, and drove them hundreds of 
miles around the state in an effort to increase confidence in its viability. Many 
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entrepreneurs said that these demonstrations were one of the main reasons that they 
adopted the technology and founded a biodiesel company.  
Agriculture trade associations also argued that their specific technology was 
scientifically tested and represented the “best practice.” They sponsored research in 
universities and then accompanied scientists to public venues to testify of the 
technologies’ effectiveness and appropriateness. Trade associations also worked to 
convince potential entrepreneurs that adopting the specific technology was in their 
best interest. For example, state soybean associations highlighted to potential 
entrepreneurs that the adoption of soybean technology to produce “soydiesel” (a term 
they coined) would be more accepted by farmers and other agriculture professionals in 
the soybean business—a group that constituted the majority of agriculture consumers 
in many states. Agriculture trade association members also touted the benefits of their 
technology for helping the country wean itself off of imported oil becoming energy 
independent and self-reliant.  
In sum, I argue that given the uncertainty surrounding new technologies at the 
beginning of new markets and technological lifecycles, the presence of key actors 
diffusing information about particular technologies and promoting normative 
prescriptions will have a positive effect on the founding of new ventures implementing 
the particular technology that an actor promotes. 
Hypothesis 1: A greater number of trade association members in a state 
promoting a specific technology will have a positive effect on the founding of 
biodiesel ventures implementing that technology. 
 
Competing Institutional Actors 
Nevertheless, much of the literature on institutions and entrepreneurship has 
focused on the one kind of institutional actor (Weber, Heinz ,and DeSoucey, 2008; 
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Sine and Lee, 2009; Hiatt, Sine and Tolbert, 2009), and has failed to take into account 
other competing institutional actors, which often characterizes early periods of new 
technologies and sectors. There is little research that examines how competing 
institutional actors may influence the effectiveness of focal institutional actors in 
emerging sectors. Yet, the idea of multiple institutional actors has been partly 
acknowledged in the research that explores competing logics (Thornton, 2001, 2002). 
For example, Lounsbury (2007) explored how different mutual fund trustee and 
performance logics espoused in Boston and New York respectively led to variation 
between the two cities in how mutual funds established contracts with professional 
money management firms. Likewise, Marquis and Lounsbury (2007) analyzed two 
kinds of banking logics, local and national, on the kinds of banks that were founded in 
rural American communities. They found that local banking beliefs held in rural 
communities negatively impacted the communities’ perception and acceptance of 
national bank entry into such areas. However, most of this work has been theoretical 
and empirical studies in the tradition have tended to act as if logics are 
compartmentalized and geographic specific.  
This paper addresses this shortcoming by explicitly focusing on both the 
independent effects of actors who are promulgating particular logics as well as the 
potential interactive effects of these logics on entrepreneurial decision-making. To 
describe the interactive or moderating effects of competing actors, it may be useful to 
use an analogy of light. By interacting with various mediums, light can be magnified, 
dampened, or even blended to create different colors. Similarly, the influence of 
promoted normative prescriptions and cognitive understandings by focal institutional 
actors may be magnified, dampened, or blended by the promoted logics of competing 
entrepreneurs and/or by the relational networks of the entrepreneurs.  
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Magnification refers to when promoted values or cognitive information have 
an amplified effect on the receiver in which the individual or organization quickly and 
wholeheartedly adopts those new viewpoints and values. This may occur when 
institutional actors promote normative prescriptions or cognitive understandings that 
are congruent with espoused beliefs, knowledge, and values, or when the promoted 
prescriptions and scripts are harmonious with other promoted logics in the institutional 
environment. This is exemplified in the promotion of insurance mutuals and dairy 
cooperatives. The Grange movement of the early 20th century experienced greater 
success at promoting these new organizational forms in counties that were dominated 
by farmers, because their agriculture-empowerment prescriptions matched the 
farmers’ rural values and interests (Schneiberg, King, and Smith, 2008).  
However, if promoted values or cognitions are incongruent with competing 
beliefs and values, two types of moderating effects may occur: dampening or 
blending. Dampening refers to when the promoted values or cognitive understandings 
have less of an influence in changing the cognitions and beliefs of individuals or 
organizations. In such cases, competing cultural values and interests overpower the 
focal institutional actor’s attempts to change the environment. For example, the 
promotion of temperance and prohibition laws by the Woman’s Christian Temperance 
Union (WCTU) had a lesser effect in areas high in German and Irish immigrants 
because the immigrants’ culture of beer consumption had an overpowering effect on 
the acceptance of incongruent WCTU values (Hiatt, Sine, Tolbert, 2009). In another 
example, Dowell, Swaminathan, and Wade (2002) studied the how opponents of high 
density television advocates engaged in collective framing processes to influence the 
adoption of HDTV in the United States. By framing HDTV as something that would 
benefit the Japanese electronics market but hurt the U.S. market (thereby framing 
HDTV as bad), broadcaster opponents succeeded in keeping HDTV from becoming a 
17 
 
standard transmission adopted by broadcasters. In sum, as competing actors diffuse 
incongruent information and frame certain technologies or opportunities as 
inappropriate, they may have a negative impact on an entrepreneur’s decision to adopt 
a particular technology and on the ability of the focal institutional actor to promote 
such technologies.  
Blending refers to when certain components of promoted values and 
information are mixed with existing values and cognitions, thereby creating new 
institutional influences that affect individuals and organizations in unintended ways. 
Similar to how the amalgamation of red and green light produces yellow, instead of 
simply dampening the institutional actor’s influence to change normative and 
cognitive understandings, the interaction of promoted beliefs and understandings with 
competing prescriptions and scripts produces a colorful mix of values and information 
in which certain components of each influence individuals and organizations in 
directions not promoted or envisioned by institutional actors.  
Competing institutional actors may moderate the effectiveness of focal 
institutional actors depending on the degree to which their values and information 
complement the normative prescriptions and cognitions promoted by focal 
institutional actors. The closer the match, the more the norms and understandings of 
competing actors may magnify the influence of focal institutional actors. The more 
incongruent the match, the greater the logics of competing actors will likely dampen 
or blend promoted prescriptions and understandings. In the following section, I will 
describe how each kind of moderating effect may occur by examining the competition 
among agriculture trade associations and environmental movement organizations.  
Dampening. If competing institutional actors have more resources and ability 
to promote their logics than the focal institutional actor, a dampening effect is likely to 
occur in which the incongruent logics of competing actors overpower those of the 
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focal actor, thereby causing individuals and organizations in the local environment to 
resist conforming to and adopting the values and scripts promoted by the focal 
institutional actors. In the case of the biodiesel sector, environmental movement lobby 
organizations opposed biodiesel production technologies that required extensive 
agricultural practices. Termed “fuel farming,” these groups issued numerous media 
statements, policies, as well as letters to law makers and their members on the 
potential negative environmental effects of producing biofuels from plant and animal 
products. Some of these impacts included groundwater and river pollution, the 
depletion of biodiversity and nutrients from soils, rising food prices, and an increase in 
the use of forests, wetland and rangeland for agriculture. Illustrating this trepidation 
towards biofuel production, the largest and most powerful environmental group in the 
United States, the Sierra Club, stated:  
Harvesting forests for fuel has a long history, but raising plants specifically for 
energy production is a departure from the historical use of plant fiber to 
produce food and goods. The Sierra Club opposes farming practices which 
supplant wilderness or other natural land, reduce genetic diversity, require 
greater energy and material input per unit production, increase use of 
manufactured fertilizers and biocides on existing agricultural lands, or which 
displace indigenous people or accelerate the conversion of family farms to 
corporate agribusiness acreage (Sierra Club, 2000). 
Similarly, Friends of the Earth, an international environmental organization with a 
large presence in the U.S. stated that “the current rush to develop agrofuels (or 
biofuels) on a large scale is ill-conceived and will contribute to an already 
unsustainable trade whilst not solving the problems of climate change or energy 
security” (Friends of the Earth, 2008: 1). 
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Other groups such as Greenpeace urged the public to boycott biodiesel 
produced from companies that promoted unsustainable agricultural practices (Pachter, 
2007) and disseminated empirical evidence that biofuels did more ecological harm 
than good. For example, members of the Nature Conservancy sponsored research 
published in the journal Science that demonstrated that carbon dioxide emissions 
generated from the cutting down of rainforests to grow crops for biodiesel would 
increase for decades or even centuries more than from using traditional fossil fuel 
(Fargione, Hill, Tilman, Polasky, and Hawthorne, 2008). As competing actors diffuse 
negative information and frame biodiesel technologies that utilize intensive 
agricultural practices as wrong and immoral, not only will they likely have a negative 
impact on entrepreneurial adoption of existing technologies, but also a dampening 
effect on the efforts of institutional actors (agriculture trade associations) promoting 
those technologies as individuals who hold environmentally friendly logics resist 
conforming to the new values and beliefs. Thus, I argue: 
Hypothesis 2a: The greater the number of environmental movement actors 
opposing intensive agricultural-related biodiesel technologies, the lower the 
founding rate of biodiesel ventures implementing those particular 
technologies. 
Hypothesis 2b: As the number of environmental movement actors increases, 
the influence of trade associations promoting intensive agriculture related 
technologies will decrease. 
 
Blending. If competing institutional actors have a moderate to lower ability in 
comparison to the focal institutional actor to promote specific values and interests, and 
are not resourceful enough to overpower the promoted scripts and prescriptions of 
institutional actors, they may cause a blending effect in which certain aspects of the 
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promoted logics of competing actors mix with specific aspects of the promoted logics 
of the focal institutional actor to influence recipients in directions not foreseen. For 
instance, the blending of two incongruent values and interests could motivate 
individuals to still found a firm in a controversial sector but seek or develop a new 
technology not promoted by trade associations and that is harmonious with the 
prescriptions and scripts espoused by opposition actors.  
In the case of the biodiesel sector, many entrepreneurs were influenced by 
trade associations as well as by the ecological values and beliefs promoted by 
environmental movement organizations. The blending of the two kinds of 
prescriptions and cognitions may have produced entrepreneurs both desirous to found 
a biodiesel venture and motivated to seek or develop substitute technologies that were 
environmentally friendly. For example, Todd Stephens, a co-founder of Tulsa Biofuels 
reported that the influence of biodiesel promotion by trade associations and the 
environmental movement’s position on fuel farming affected their decision to found a 
biodiesel plant and develop feedstock technologies that would be profitable yet 
ecologically sustainable. He said:  
I’ve been involved in the environmental movement for about a decade, pretty 
hardcore; I sit on boards and that sort of thing and I’m really into 
sustainability. You can make biodiesel out of any oil or fat and it can be made 
out of virgin soybean oil, which is what they do so much of, which is something 
I’m actually against because it’s not sustainable. You’re taking away from the 
food supply. [But] algae are a great. [They’re] looking to be a great 
alternative because they can clean up municipal waste water and they grow 
very, very quickly. You squeeze that sucker, and you get oil and a nutrient-rich 
meal which can be turned into biogas. So, algae are definitely the future for 
feedstock. In the meantime though, we use waste cooking oil, which has lived 
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its life and turn that into an alternative fuel, and we feel that’s the most 
sustainable way to do it right now (Stephens, 2008). 
In sum, I argue that if an incongruity exists between the information and normative 
prescriptions of the opposition actors those promulgated by the focal institutional actor 
and if the competing actor’s influence is not as strong as that of the focal institutional 
actor, there is a greater probability that a blending effect will take place. The result of 
which will foster unintended foundings of new ventures implementing technologies 
not promoted by focal trade associations.  
Hypothesis 3: As the number of environmental movement actors opposing 
intensive agricultural technologies increases, trade associations promoting 
technologies related to agricultural-intensive practices will have an 
unintended positive influence on the founding of new ventures developing non-
promoted non-intensive agricultural related technologies. 
 
Magnification. On the other hand, if the values and interests of the focal actor 
align with those of competing institutional actors, the influence of the focal 
institutional actor may be increased, thereby leading to greater entrepreneurial 
adoption of that promoted technology. In the case of the biodiesel industry, while 
environmental movement groups generally attacked the biodiesel sector, not all of the 
promoted technologies were at the center of the attack. A small handful of promoted 
biodiesel technologies did not require intensive agricultural practices to produce their 
raw materials. The environmental benefits for these types of technologies should be 
more salient and desirable in areas where greater numbers of competing institutional 
actors promote awareness of the damaging effects of agriculture-intensive biodiesel 
technologies. The increase in value of technologies related to non-intensive agriculture 
practices may amplify the effect of the focal actor’s promoted normative prescriptions 
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and cognitive understandings. Thus, I posit that as values and understandings align 
between focal and competing institutional actors, the effectiveness of the focal 
institutional actor changing the institutional environment will increase as individuals 
become more willing to adopt those practices.  
Hypothesis 4a: As the number of environmental movement actors opposing 
agricultural-intensive biodiesel technologies increases, the founding of new 
ventures implementing non-intensive agriculture related technologies will 
increase. 
Hypothesis 4b: As the number of environmental movement actors increases, 
the influence of trade associations promoting non-intensive agriculture related 
technologies will increase.  
 
Moderating Effects of Network Relations: De Novo vs. De Alio Entrepreneurs 
Entrepreneurial decision-making and susceptibility to the advocacy efforts 
described above may also be affected by network relations of the entrepreneur. 
Individuals who found new ventures in a particular sector likely come from a variety 
of structural-relational contexts, which can affect they way they react to newly 
promoted prescriptions and understandings. A few empirical studies have documented 
how network relations can affect the way organizations perceive logics and practices. 
For example, Rao, Davis and Ward (2000) argued that ties to organizations shaped 
how firms within the NASDAQ responded to requests from NYSE actors to leave the 
NASDAQ and join the NYSE. Publicly-traded companies with more ties to companies 
within the NASDAQ were less likely to be influenced by NYSE pressure to leave and 
more likely to stay in the NASDAQ because the ties created a greater sense of identity 
and value among peer firms within the NASDAQ. In another example, Davis and 
Greve (1997) studied how board interlocks and local organizational ties affected the 
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way organizations perceived newly promoted business practices: poison pills and 
golden parachutes. They concluded that ties and interlocks to organizations that had 
adopted such practices shaped their view of legitimacy of those practices, thereby 
leading to greater adoption. Thus, relational structures may have a significant 
influence on companies’ judgments and values of what is important and what is not. 
Similarly, it is likely that entrepreneurs with ties to firms or individuals immersed in 
distinct institutional contexts may respond differently to institutional actors promoting 
technological prescriptions and beliefs as their ties may affect how they view certain 
aspects of the institutional environment.  
Two types of entrepreneurs that may be distinctly embedded and respond 
differently to prescription and information diffused by institutional actors are de novo 
and de alio entrants. De novo entrepreneurs start ventures without direct linkages to or 
sponsorship from other organizations, while de alio entrepreneurs are sponsored by 
companies in that area (Carroll and Hannan, 2000). To offer an example, in the case of 
the biodiesel industry, Tulsa Biofuels, co-founded by three individuals not connected 
to or sponsored by another organization, would be a de novo entrant while the 
founding of Paseo Cargill Energy LLC, started with resources and sponsorship from 
Cargill—a soybean crushing giant—would be a de alio entrant.  
Previous research on de novo and de alio entrepreneurs has found that de novo 
entrepreneurs tend to be more focused on the cultural and economic environment of 
the new sector because they are not connected to or retain activities from other 
industries (McKendrick, Jaffee, Carroll, & Khessina, 2003). Because de novo 
entrepreneurs tend to have fewer available resources at startup than de alio entrants, 
they may have a greater motivation to become isomorphic with the environment and 
espouse the local prescriptions and cognitions in an effort to garner greater local 
legitimacy.  
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On the other hand, because de alio entrepreneurs often found organizations 
with greater available resources than de novo entrants, they may not be as motivated to 
engage in actions that will generate local legitimacy. Additionally, de alio 
entrepreneurs draw upon resources and technological expertise from origin companies, 
creating a resource dependence in which they often need to report to and justify their 
actions to interested sponsors and critics from other external environments (Carroll, 
Bigelow, Seidel, & Tsai, 1996). Thus, slack resources and pressures to report and 
appear legitimate to external organizations may cause de alio entrepreneurs to be more 
concerned about conforming to the external cultural beliefs and values of the external 
organizations to which they have ties than those of the focal environment. This could 
negatively moderate the influence that focal and competing institutional actors have on 
their technological choices. 
Interviews with de alio entrants in the biodiesel sector provide support for this 
argument. For example, an entrepreneur from a de alio biodiesel venture noted that 
while they were located in Illinois, a state with a powerful trade association, they did 
not feel pressure to heed the association’s prescriptions or information to adopt 
soybean production technologies. Instead, their technological choices were largely 
based on the economic and social demands of the chemical sector where their parent 
company was located. He noted:  
We’re an oddball in that we’re also a large specialty chemical company. When 
biodiesel came around, all we had to do was roll over our existing assets. But 
biodiesel isn’t our primary business, and we don’t necessarily bring in and 
convert soybean oil. We use other oils to make detergent-type products and 
biodiesel esters. We don’t have to make biodiesel, but we’re committed to it 
and we’re in it for the long haul. 
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I posit that because de novo entrepreneurs have a greater need for legitimacy in the 
focal environment, they will be more susceptible to the influence of strong 
institutional actors in their geographic area. In contrast, because de alio entrants are 
likely to respond to the cultural and cognitive understandings of other environmental 
contexts due to their ties to external organizations, they will be less likely to adopt the 
values and beliefs of focal and competing institutional actors than their de novo 
counterparts, thereby dampening the influence of institutional actors.  
 
Hypothesis 5a: Greater numbers of trade association members promoting 
biodiesel technologies will have a greater positive effect on the adoption of 
that technology among de novo than de alio entrants.  
Hypothesis 5b: Greater numbers of environmental movement actors opposing 
intensive-agriculture technologies will have a greater negative effect on the 
adoption of agricultural-intensive technologies and a greater positive effect on 
adoption of non-intensive agriculture biodiesel technologies among de novo 
than de alio entrants. 
 
Methods 
In this study, I focus on the moderating effects of competing institutional 
actors and network relations on a focal institutional actor’s ability to influence 
entrepreneurial decision-making. Empirically, I analyze how the norms and beliefs of 
the local institutional environment (as measured by the presence of opposition actors) 
and network relations can moderate the influence of agriculture trade associations on 
biodiesel foundings and technological choice. The window of observation is 1990 to 
2008. I use 1990 as the base year because that is the year that agriculture trade 
associations began sponsoring biodiesel university research and promoting such 
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technologies and I end data collection on December 31, 2008. A total of 267 biodiesel 
production plants were founded during this period. Of the 267 foundings, 223 were de 
novo and 44 were de alio entrants. 
Dependent Variables. The dependent variables for this study are technology-
specific biodiesel founding events in a given state-year. I focus on the five most 
prominent biodiesel transesterification technologies related to soybean, canola, 
cottonseed, animal fats, and waste vegetable oil. Data on biodiesel producers come 
from quarterly reports generated by the National Biodiesel Board as well as archival 
reports from individual producers. From this information I am able to measure when 
each biodiesel plant began and ceased operation, the total number of biodiesel plants 
operating in a state, whether they are de alio or de novo, their contact information, 
their total production capacity, and the feedstock technology they used over time. I 
coded biodiesel ventures as de alio if media reports on their foundings (such as articles 
published in Biodiesel Magazine) mentioned their origin company.  
Key Predictor Variables. I contacted all agriculture trade associations that 
represent producers of organic oils in the United States to find out whether they had 
promoted biodiesel. Six trade associations reported to have actively promoted 
biodiesel production technologies, namely, the American Soybean Association, 
National Renderers Association, United States Canola Association, National Corn 
Growers Association, National Sunflower Association, and the National Cottonseed 
Producers Association. Because many of these organizations are federative in nature, 
the state chapters are free to decide when and what they will promote. I contacted 
every state and national organization and obtained information on their membership, 
the dates of when the state chapters and national organizations began promoting 
biodiesel as well as information on the promotion tactics they used. Because 
information on promotion tactics was limited, I left them out of the analysis. The first 
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trade association to sponsor university research and promote biodiesel technologies 
was the Missouri chapter of the American Soybean Association in 1990.  
I measured the strength of individual trade associations by using the total 
number of active members of each trade association promoting a specific technology 
in a given state-year. If a state trade association was not promoting biodiesel, 
membership size was tallied as 0. However, once they began promoting biodiesel, I 
used their actual size in membership to measure their influence. Because I am also 
concerned with the moderating effect of competing institutional actors, I control for 
environmental members that are skeptical and antagonistic of certain biodiesel 
production technologies. I included a variable of state-level membership data from the 
Sierra Club, which, over my time period, was the largest grass-roots environmental 
organization and one of the most vocal against unsustainable biofuels in the United 
States.3
Control Variables. I controlled for the general state economic activity by 
including gross state product per capita and state population. Information on state 
population comes from the U.S. Census Bureau, while gross state product is obtained 
from the U.S. Department of Commerce. Because local access to biodiesel raw 
materials can affect the decision of entrepreneurs to found a biodiesel plant (Baker and 
Nelson, 2005; Sine and Lee, 2009), I controlled for the total amount of locally 
available raw materials and their price by calculating the total pounds of animal fats, 
plant oils and waste vegetable oil (yellow grease) produced by state. I calculated the 
  
                                                 
3 I also created a variable that measured the number of non-governmental 
environmental organizations in a state by year and found similar yet weak results. The 
data come from the Conservation Directory, a yearly publication that reports all 
governmental and nonprofit environmental organizations in operation by state. 
However, this data is limited in that it does not report the organizations’ membership. 
Thus, we cannot accurately estimate size. Because of this, I used membership of the 
Sierra Club by state to measure the influence of environmental movement lobbying 
groups on entrepreneurs.  
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pounds of rendered animal fats by taking the pounds of pigs, cattle, and poultry 
slaughtered by state and computing the average percent of rendered fat per animal as 
determined by the National Renderers Association (Meeker, 2006). I calculated the 
amount of plant oils by summing the total bushels of sunflower, safflower, canola, 
rapeseed, soybean, corn, peanuts, cottonseed, and flaxseed harvested in a state and 
computing the average pounds of oil derived from each type of seed as determined by 
the United States Department of Agriculture’s (USDA) National Agricultural 
Statistical Service. The data reveal the annual amount of crops harvested and animals 
slaughtered and the commodity prices for each type of oil and fat by year. As a 
measure of the pounds of waste vegetable oil produced by state, I counted the total 
number of food establishments per state and multiplied this by 372 pounds per month, 
the average amount of waste vegetable oil discarded by a restaurant (Vernet, 2005). 
The number of food service establishments comes from the U.S. Census Bureau’s 
Economic Census. I then created a proportion variable by dividing the amount of 
technology-corresponding raw material fats by the total amount of fats and oils (in 
pounds) of biodiesel raw material sources in a given state-year. 
Prior research has found that organizational density can affect the amount of 
available resources and thereby influence new-venture foundings and the propensity to 
innovate (Hannan and Freeman, 1977; Katila and Shane, 2005). As such, I controlled 
for competition by summing the number of operating biodiesel plants using a specific 
technology in each state by year. Given that profitability can affect the decision of 
entrepreneurs to adopt a particular technological process, I controlled for profitability 
in the models of founding, technological innovation and diversity by taking the 
average price of retail diesel sold in a state and subtracting it from the sum of the 
average cost of labor, capital, and chemical transesterification costs, and the annual 
average price of biodiesel raw materials per gallon using a weighted index score of 
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feedstock spot prices recorded by the USDA’s National Agricultural Statistical 
Service. I calculated the labor and chemical costs by adding 81 cents to a gallon 
biodiesel (the industry average for labor and capital costs) with the price of methanol 
needed to make a gallon of biodiesel. I obtained data on state average retail diesel 
prices from U.S. Department of Energy. I then created a technology-specific 
profitability variable by subtracting the price of retail diesel fuel from the total labor, 
chemical costs and the average price of the corresponding raw material (Van Gerpen, 
Pruszko, Clements, Shanks, and Knothe, 2006). Included in the profitability variable 
was the 2005 federal subsidy of biodiesel. The subsidy provided a tax credit of $1.00 
per gallon for technologies that transformed oilseed crops into biodiesel and $.50 per 
gallon for technologies that transformed other kinds of feedstocks such as animal fats 
and yellow grease into biodiesel.  
Finally, I supplemented archival data with thirty-two interviews with biodiesel 
founders and twenty-six interviews with state and national agriculture trade 
associations and Sierra Club organization members across the nation. The interviews 
represented every technology developed and implemented during this time period. The 
interview data grounded my choice of measures and strengthened my understanding of 
hypothesized structural relationships.  
Analysis 
Biodiesel entrants must choose from among a host of potential biodiesel 
production processes. In order to accurately measure the influence of a particular 
institutional actor in a given state-year on the founding of a biodiesel venture using a 
specific technological process, I used a competing risks regression. A competing risk 
is defined as an “event whose occurrence either precludes the occurrence of another 
event under investigation or fundamentally alters the probability of occurrence of this 
other event” (Gooley, Leisenring, Crowley, and Storer,1999: 695). Much of the 
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previous work on competing risks has relied upon Kaplan-Meier estimates (1-KM) 
from conventional event-history analyses to measure the prevalence of an event of 
interest. However, using a Kaplan-Meier distribution function to produce a cumulative 
incident function creates a biased estimate of the event of interest because competing 
events are treated as if they were censored. One has to assume that the event of 
interest, or type 1 event, occurs where type 2 or type 3 events do not (Gooley, 
Leisenring, Crowley, and Storer, 1999).  
Unlike conventional hazard analyses, the competing risks regression uses the 
cumulative incidence function (CIF) which considers not only the subhazard for the 
event of interest type 1, h1(t), but also the subhazards of concurrent competing events, 
h2(t), h3(t), and hi(t). Thus, a competing-risks regression treats the CIF as a function of 
all hazards [e.g. h1(t), h2(t), h3(t), hi(t)] whereas conventional measures of prevalence 
(1-KM) treat the CIF as a function solely of h1(t). The competing risks regression is 
based on the model by Fine and Gray (1999) and is similar to the Cox semi-parametric 
model. The general form is given as:  
h1(t) = h1,0(t) exp(β x) 
where h1(t) is the subhazard function of interest, x is a vector of covariates, β is a 
vector of subhazard ratios, and h1,0(t) is the baseline subhazard rate for covariates set 
to zero. Because competing risks regressions take into account the probability of other 
competing technological choices, it is a highly robust analysis to measure the impact 
of a variety of institutional actors as well as the moderating effects of the local cultural 
milieu and relational structures on entrepreneurial choice. Finally, some of my 
variables were highly correlated (such as trade association membership and the 
interaction of trade association and the institutional environment) which can inflate 
standard errors and makes regression coefficients unstable. To deal with the 
multicollinearity, I used a Gram–Schmidt procedure which partials out the common 
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variance between these highly correlated variables and creates transformed variables 
that are uncorrelated with each other (Cohen and Cohen, 1983; Saville and Wood, 
1991). 
Results 
The first biodiesel founding occurred in 1993 in Missouri, with one or two 
more a year in a few other states. Foundings began to increase beginning in 2002 and 
by 2007, the states averaged 1.70 foundings per year with Texas leading the way with 
8.5 foundings per year. Descriptive statistics and bivariate correlations for analyses in 
table 1. The results of competing risks regressions predicting founding events with 
particular agriculture-intensive related technologies among all entrants are found in 
table 2 while the competing risks regressions predicting founding events with specific 
non-intensive agriculture related technologies are reported in table 3. Competing risks 
regressions of de novo entrants adopting agriculture-intensive and non- intensive 
agriculture related technologies are reported in tables 4 and 5 respectively, and results 
of de alio entrants adopting agriculture-intensive and non-intensive agriculture related 
technologies are reported in tables 6 and 7 respectively.  
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Table 1 
Descriptive Statistics and Bivariate Correlations 
 
  Variable Mean Std. Dev. 
1 State population 5448646 6068711 
2 Gross state product per capita 0.033 0.014 
3 Soybean technology density 0.086 0.375 
4 Soybean technology profitability -22.058 51.478 
5 Soybean technology raw materials 0.232 0.249 
6 Cottonseed technology density 0.005 0.085 
7 Cottonseed technology profitability -59.469 54.114 
8 Cottonseed technology raw materials 0.048 0.109 
9 Tallow technology density 0.020 0.153 
10 Tallow technology profitability 17.045 51.441 
11 Tallow technology raw materials 0.225 0.231 
12 Corn technology density 0.004 0.064 
13 Corn technology profitability -145.707 69.133 
14 Corn technology raw materials 0.188 0.184 
15 Canola technology density 0.011 0.115 
16 Canola technology profitability -54.313 39.414 
17 Canola technology raw materials 0.010 0.035 
19 Sunflower technology profitability -150.691 58.500 
20 Sunflower technology raw materials 47719 241818 
21 Yellow grease technology density 0.035 0.238 
22 Yellow grease technology profitability 41.241 48.638 
23 Yellow grease technology raw materials 0.233 0.317 
24 American soybean association 360 849 
25 National renderers association 1.714 2.772 
26 
National cottonseed producers 
association 0.279 1.362 
27 National corn growers association 671 1392 
28 United State canola association 1.585 14.332 
29 National sunflower association 0.2693 0.7543 
30 Sierra Club 12609 25392 
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Table 1 (Continued) 
 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
1 1 
       2 -0.001 1 
      3 0.176 0.049 1 
     4 0.014 0.322 0.136 1 
    5 0.008 -0.169 0.051 -0.090 1 
   6 0.187 0.035 0.376 0.074 -0.053 1 
  7 -0.010 0.169 0.007 0.726 -0.084 0.043 1 
 8 0.385 -0.134 0.103 -0.053 -0.076 0.169 -0.011 1 
9 0.023 0.017 0.493 0.083 0.094 0.151 -0.054 0.014 
10 0.017 0.315 0.186 0.912 -0.074 0.086 0.584 -0.055 
11 0.065 -0.149 0.024 -0.014 -0.244 0.019 -0.037 0.042 
12 0.041 -0.006 0.286 0.025 -0.006 0.186 -0.048 0.059 
13 0.017 0.357 0.072 0.750 -0.075 0.052 0.719 -0.033 
14 -0.057 -0.115 0.081 0.014 0.267 -0.007 -0.001 -0.275 
15 0.013 0.008 0.264 0.071 -0.046 0.099 -0.046 -0.008 
16 -0.014 0.197 -0.023 0.839 -0.122 0.034 0.844 -0.033 
17 -0.173 -0.107 -0.047 -0.005 -0.116 -0.018 0.004 -0.069 
18 -0.012 0.104 0.033 0.448 -0.105 0.009 0.622 -0.021 
19 -0.113 -0.060 0.025 -0.017 0.062 0.007 -0.022 -0.076 
20 0.286 0.065 0.498 0.130 -0.088 0.298 0.041 0.160 
21 0.017 0.334 0.199 0.920 -0.082 0.086 0.551 -0.062 
22 -0.121 0.410 -0.116 0.118 -0.574 -0.032 0.109 -0.171 
23 0.015 -0.028 0.083 -0.002 0.592 -0.021 -0.023 -0.164 
24 0.518 0.102 0.418 0.222 0.195 0.364 0.040 0.208 
25 0.238 0.054 0.606 0.186 0.078 0.524 0.037 0.137 
26 0.072 -0.038 0.089 -0.025 0.548 -0.021 -0.024 -0.140 
27 0.046 0.028 0.023 0.067 0.037 -0.007 0.022 0.032 
28 0.171 0.124 0.358 0.270 0.024 0.301 0.130 0.087 
29 0.833 0.065 0.124 0.060 -0.133 0.028 0.036 0.344 
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Table 1 (Continued)  
 
  9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 
9 1 
       10 0.140 1 
      11 0.016 -0.061 1 
     12 0.202 0.054 0.017 1 
    13 -0.009 0.594 0.019 -0.022 1 
   14 0.016 0.039 -0.287 0.029 -0.012 1 
  15 0.221 0.123 0.089 0.273 -0.011 0.001 1 
 16 -0.060 0.712 -0.008 -0.056 0.716 -0.019 -0.042 1 
17 -0.036 -0.012 -0.148 -0.002 0.010 -0.081 -0.003 0.019 
18 -0.042 0.245 0.031 -0.018 0.596 -0.002 -0.029 0.566 
19 -0.012 -0.014 -0.132 -0.009 -0.027 -0.031 -0.006 -0.014 
20 0.350 0.176 0.047 0.329 0.075 -0.021 0.324 0.021 
21 0.147 0.989 -0.059 0.059 0.596 0.041 0.129 0.692 
22 -0.073 0.125 -0.391 -0.039 0.089 -0.305 -0.017 0.138 
23 0.101 -0.002 -0.238 -0.011 0.028 0.344 -0.031 -0.032 
24 0.188 0.253 0.007 0.140 0.224 0.100 0.121 0.065 
25 0.449 0.254 -0.015 0.223 0.088 0.005 0.157 -0.004 
26 0.070 -0.025 -0.212 -0.020 -0.020 0.317 -0.034 -0.033 
27 -0.008 0.075 0.076 0.020 0.060 -0.051 0.012 0.017 
28 0.050 0.282 0.014 0.126 0.253 0.127 0.201 0.167 
29 -0.013 0.063 0.066 -0.004 0.055 -0.085 0.010 0.042 
 
  17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 
17 1 
       18 0.008 1 
      19 0.516 -0.030 1 
     20 -0.033 0.027 -0.018 1 
    21 -0.009 0.246 -0.012 0.183 1 
   22 -0.088 0.087 -0.147 -0.007 0.133 1 
  23 -0.075 -0.020 0.033 -0.054 -0.003 -0.313 1 
 24 -0.143 -0.013 -0.044 0.331 0.276 -0.239 0.279 1 
25 -0.055 0.062 -0.017 0.405 0.260 -0.091 0.077 0.466 
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In table 2, models 1, 5 and 9 contain only the control variables; models 2, 6 
and 10 add the strength of a particular institutional actor (agriculture trade association) 
promoting a certain technology as measured by its membership; models 3, 7, and 11 
add the impact of competing actors as measured by Sierra Club membership; and 
models 4, 8, and 12 include the interactions between trade association and Sierra Club 
actors. Some of the control variables significantly impacted technological choice. For 
example, in many of the technological choices, the availability of raw materials 
specific to that technological process and the technological density had a positive 
impact on the adoption of that technology, consistent with prior expectations. States 
with lower gross state product per capita also had a positive effect on the choice of 
agriculture-intensive related technologies.  
In table 3, models 1 and 5 contain the control variables; models 2 and 6 include 
trade associations promoting non-intensive agriculture related (canola) and 
agriculture-intensive related technologies (soybean, cottonseed, and animal fats), 
respectively; models 3 and 7 include state Sierra Club membership; and models 4 and 
8 adds the interaction Sierra Club membership and agricultural trade associations. 
Similar to adoption of agriculture-intensive related technologies, raw material 
availability and technological density had positive impacts on the adoption of non-
intensive agriculture related technologies.  
Turning hypotheses 1, 2 and 4, in tables 2 and 3 the strength of a specific trade 
association generally had a positive effect on the adoption of that particular 
technology at founding, thus supporting hypothesis 1. A greater presence of soybean, 
renderers, canola, and cottonseed agriculture trade associations promoting their 
specific biodiesel technologies positively impacted entrepreneurial adoption of those 
processes. Additionally, the results indicate that a greater presence of Sierra Club who 
opposed biodiesel technological processes related to intensive agricultural practices 
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had a negative impact on the adoption of those technologies and a positive effect on 
the adoption on non-intensive agricultural related technologies, thus supporting 
hypotheses 2a and 4a respectively. However, the interaction between incongruent 
values and beliefs of Sierra Club actors and promoted technologies did not have a 
significant dampening effect on the influence of agricultural trade associations, 
revealing little support for hypothesis 2b.  
Hypothesis 4b posited that the congruence between the values and beliefs of 
Sierra Club actors and the technologies promoted by trade associations will have an 
amplifying effect on the influence of trade associations. In model 4 of table 3, the 
results demonstrate that trade associations promoting non-intensive agriculture related 
technologies such as canola transesterification4
Turning to tables 4 -7, models 1, 4, and 7 contain the control variables for each 
technological process; models 2, 5, and 8, add the trade association promoting a 
specific technology as measured by membership; and models 3, 6, and 9 add the 
impact of Sierra Club members. For tables 4 and 5, the results indicate that the 
strength of an institutional actor promoting new prescriptions and information has a 
 have the greatest effect in 
environments where there are greater numbers of Sierra Club members, thereby 
supporting hypothesis 4b. In hypothesis 3, I argue that a blending effect will occur in 
areas where trade association actors promote prescriptions and understandings that are 
incongruent with promoted values and beliefs of the Sierra Club. The results in model 
8 of table 3 support this hypothesis. Incongruence among cognitions motivates 
entrepreneurs to develop and adopt novel non-intensive agriculture related 
technologies that transform raw materials such as waste vegetable oil (yellow grease).  
                                                 
4 The Sierra Club stated that biodiesel made from “recurring oil-seed crops such as 
canola, which can be grown as part of regular crop rotation cycles without intensive 
water use” are less damaging to the environment than other traditional agriculture 
products (Sierra Club, 2007). 
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significant positive effect on technology implementation among de novo entrants, thus 
supporting hypothesis 5a. Greater numbers of soybean, renderers, cottonseed, and 
canola trade associations fostered greater adoption of that particular technology among 
de novo than de alio ventures. Additionally, greater numbers of Sierra Club activists 
negatively reduced the adoption of one of the intensive agricultural related 
technologies among de novo entrants, thus offering partial support to hypothesis 5b. 
The choices of de alio entrepreneurs were less likely to be affected by the presence of 
either focal or competing institutional actors than their de novo counterparts.  
Discussion 
In this paper, I examined how competing institutional actors and network 
relations can moderate the influence of focal institutional actors in changing 
entrepreneurial cognitive and normative understandings. The results show that the 
impact of promoted prescriptions and information was moderated by competing 
institutional actors and the network relations of entrepreneurial firms. Competing 
institutional actors had both a magnifying and blending effect on focal actor influence. 
When promoted technologies were in harmony with the Sierra Club’s prescriptions 
and understandings, trade association actors had an amplified effect on technological 
choice and foundings. However, when technologies were incongruent with the 
prescriptions and cognitions of the Sierra Club, a blending effect occurred in which 
promoted technologies and practices caused entrepreneurs to seek out and develop 
new technologies that would fit their environmental beliefs and values.   
Additionally, the results demonstrate that de alio entrepreneurs were less likely 
than de novo entrepreneurs to be influenced by trade association or Sierra Club actors 
to found a firm using a specific promoted technology. Strong ties to organizations and 
individuals in other cultural and economic contexts cause de alio entrepreneurs to be 
less concerned about conforming to norms and values of the focal environment or 
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those promoted by institutional actors. Thus, entrepreneurial embeddedness had a 
dampening effect on the influence of institutional actors on entrepreneurs.  
This paper makes several theoretical contributions. First, much of the past 
research at the nexus of institutions and entrepreneurship has focused on one actor 
endorsing a single organizational practice, when in the institutional environment there 
are typically many types of actors promoting many different kinds of practices and 
technologies among a host of possibilities, exerting many different pressures on 
organizations (Weber, Heinz, and DeSoucey, 2008; Hiatt, Sine, and Tolbert, 2009; 
Sine and Lee, 2009). Little is known about how competing actors promoting various 
practices and technological designs can affect entrepreneurial decision-making at the 
beginning of new sectors and technological lifecycles. This study contributes to this 
research by showing that opposition actors can moderate the influence of focal 
institutional actors by magnifying or by blending their influence, thereby affecting 
new ventures in unintentional ways.  
Second, the results contribute to the technology entrepreneurship literature 
which is concerned how new technologies develop and diffuse over time (Tushman 
and Anderson, 1986; Rosenbloom and Christensen, 1994) Organizational scholars 
acknowledge the influence of institutional actors on new technology adoption, yet 
much of this work as focused on the entrepreneurial adoption of the promoted 
technologies (Garud, Jain, and Kumaraswamy, 2002; Hargrave and Van de Ven, 2006; 
Sine, Haveman, and Tolbert, 2005) and has neglected how moderating forces in the 
institutional environment can transform institutional actor influence into a source of 
innovation. Building on past research, this paper finds that the promotion of existing 
technologies by institutional actors can also be the impetus behind new technology 
development when promoted prescriptions and understandings conflict with values 
and interests promoted by competing actors.  
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Third, few empirical studies have analyzed how the effectiveness of 
institutional actors can be moderated by the characteristics of their targets. Much of 
the literature assumes that organizations and entrepreneurs are affected by promoted 
prescriptions and scripts equally, and largely overlooks the role of industry structure, 
social ties, or cultural backgrounds in impacting targets’ perceptions of new values 
and information. Unlike prior work, this study probes how structural embeddedness 
can affect entrepreneurial entrants’ propensity to be influenced by the cultural-
cognitive promotions of institutional actors. While my analysis considers the 
moderating effects of peripheral relational and cultural contexts, it does not address 
how other characteristics such as an entrepreneur’s previous work experience (Burton, 
Sorenson, and Beckman, 2002; Phillips, 2002), educational background (Shane, 2000), 
or personality may affect a target’s disposition of influence. Research that investigates 
the moderating effects of individual characteristics on the ability of institutional actors 
to instigate change is needed.  
Finally, this paper is not without its limitations. For example, while I use de 
alio entrepreneurs to measure ties to outside organizations, I do not measure how other 
kinds of ties may influence the effectiveness of institutional actors. It is possible that a 
more in-depth analysis at entrepreneurial embeddedness may provide more nuanced 
effects such as magnifying or blending, instead of just a dampening as the results of 
this study indicate. Research on how the variety of entrepreneurial ties on founder 
decision-making is warranted.  
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CHAPTER 3 
 
THE EFFECT OF INSTITUTIONAL ACTOR COMPETITION ON 
ENTREPRENEURIAL ACTIVITY IN THE U.S. BIODIESEL INDUSTRY  
 
Introduction 
Entrepreneurship literature has generally focused on the effects of 
technological development in producing new markets and generating entrepreneurial 
activity (Schumpeter, 1934; Tushman and Anderson, 1986; Garud and Kumaraswamy, 
1995; Rosenbloom and Christensen, 1994), and has largely ignored how social 
structure and cultural change can create new sectors and facilitate entrepreneurial 
exploitation. Recently, however, organizational scholars have begun to analyze how 
the actions of powerful institutional actors can create social structures that are 
conducive to entrepreneurs engaging in new types of economic activities (Rao, 
Morrill, and Zald, 2000; Swaminathan and Wade, 2001; Schneiberg, King, and Smith, 
2008; Weber, Heinze, and DeSoucey, 2008; Hiatt, Sine, and Tolbert, 2009).5
                                                 
5 While there are many ways in which scholars have defined institutions and 
institutional actors, in this paper I define institutions as organizational forms, 
components, structures, or technologies that have become taken-for-granted as 
efficacious and necessary (Meyer and Rowan, 1977). I define institutional actors as 
individual or collective actors that promote organizational arrangements or structures 
in an effort to institutionalize them (DiMaggio, 1988; Tolbert and Zucker, 1996).  
 By 
legitimating certain practices and resources within a field and lobbying for regulatory 
changes, researchers have noted how institutional actors can create opportunities for 
entrepreneurs to found new organizations such as bureaucratic thrifts, wind-power 
generation plants, and organic certifying agencies (Haveman, Rao, and Paruchuri, 
2007; Sine and Lee, 2009; Lee, 2009).  
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For example, by successfully lobbying for the passage of renewable energy 
state tax credits, the Sierra Club helped produce the nascent renewable energy sector 
by facilitating foundings of wind-power producers and making the endeavors more 
profitable than they otherwise would be (Sine and Lee, 2009). Likewise, the Grange 
Alliance of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries facilitated the formation 
of human capital, networks, and commercial partnerships necessary for the emergence 
of new forms of insurance companies and dairy and grain-elevator cooperatives 
(Schneiberg, King, and Smith, 2008).  
Although studies such as these have enhanced our understanding of how 
powerful actors can facilitate opportunity creation and exploitation, they largely evoke 
a “hero” image of one actor endorsing a single organizational practice, when in the 
institutional environment there are typically many types of actors promoting many 
different kinds of practices and technologies, exerting many different pressures on 
organizations. Little is known about how actors promoting competing practices and 
technological designs—or institutional actor heterogeneity—can affect entrepreneurial 
decision-making at the beginning of new sectors and technological lifecycles.  
Yet, pluralistic pressures exerted by multiple actors may greatly affect 
entrepreneurial decision-making in emerging sectors and markets where many 
unproven technologies and practices exist and where standards and dominant designs 
are yet to be developed. In deciding to found a firm, entrepreneurs must choose among 
often uncertain technologies, trying to select ones in the long run will provide the 
greatest opportunity for organizational survival. For example, in the early years of the 
bicycle industry, entrepreneurs faced the difficult decisions of entering the unproven 
sector and then choosing a successful design when no dominant design or standard 
existed (Pinch and Bijker, 1984; Dowell and Swaminathan, 2006). Bicycle 
entrepreneurs could choose to adopt the British ‘ordinary’ models of the large front 
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wheel, small rear wheel and direct pedal drive, or three other different (yet popular) 
designs including the safety bicycle that eventually became the dominant design. 
Thus, given the challenges related to emerging sectors and technologies, how do 
multiple institutional actors promoting distinct technologies or designs with numerous 
potential consequences affect entrepreneurial decision-making? Do they discourage or 
encourage foundings? Does the presence of a number of options encourage or 
discourage technological innovation and variation?  
I address these questions by examining the impact of competing institutional 
actors on entrepreneurial founding rates and technological variation in the U.S. 
biodiesel industry. Empirically, I explore how multiple agriculture trade associations 
promoting specific biodiesel technologies related to their industry can alter the 
cultural-cognitive environment and influence new-venture foundings, innovation and 
diversity in the biodiesel market from 1990 through 2008.  
Biodiesel industry 
The biodiesel sector presents an ideal context in which to study the effect of 
actor heterogeneity on entrepreneurial activity. Biodiesel is fuel derived from a variety 
of organic sources for use in compression-ignition (diesel) engines. Typical feedstock 
oil includes soybean and canola oils, beef and pork tallow, and fryer oil from 
restaurants. Once oil is extruded from oil-seed plants, rendered from animal carcasses, 
or siphoned from restaurant grease traps, it undergoes a transesterification process in a 
biodiesel production facility where, through varying technologies individualized for 
each kind of extracted oil, glycerol is removed from triacylglycerol (triglyceride) 
leaving alkyl esters, resulting in a liquid compound that has properties similar to 
petroleum distillates used to power diesel engines. The type of fats and oils used as 
feedstocks determines the type of chemical and mechanical process or technological 
design. For example, many refined vegetable oils have low percentages of free fatty 
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acids whereas crude vegetable, animal tallow, and recycled vegetable oils contain 
more free fatty acids and phospholipids as well as other contaminants that must be 
dealt with using specific chemical processes before customized transesterification 
processes can take place (Van Gerpen, Pruszko, Clements, Shanks, and Knothe, 2006). 
Thus, the technological design used to process, for example, soybeans is different 
from that used to process, for example, poultry fats. 
The technology to make biodiesel came about through a series of 
improvements in soap-making technology. Early raw materials for soap production 
included corn oil, peanut oil, hemp oil, and animal tallow. However, the alkyl esters 
formed using the soap-making process in the 19th century were highly contaminated 
with potassium soaps and discarded. The transesterification technology used today to 
produce alkyl esters (biodiesel) is based on techniques developed by chemists at 
DuPont and Colgate-Palmolive-Pete during World War II. Soap and chemical 
companies at the time received government contracts to produce pure glycerin, a 
component of explosives, and the alkyl esters continued to be largely discarded (Van 
Gerpen, Pruszko, Clements, Shanks, and Knothe, 2006). Interest in transesterification 
technology largely waned after WWII the United States, although researchers 
continued to develop an understanding of the underlying chemical process, attention to 
the potential uses of the technology and in particular to alkyl esters in generating fuel 
commenced after the oil shocks of the 1970s in universities.  
Yet, the use of vegetable oil as an engine fuel is not new. It traces its 
beginnings with the invention of the diesel engine. In 1897, Rudolph Diesel 
successfully created a prototype of the world’s first “heat” engine that ran without 
spark. While the first prototypes ran mostly on petroleum distillates, Diesel spent the 
latter part of his life tweaking successive models to run on pure vegetables oils and 
promoting the use thereof. He said: “The use of vegetable oils for engine fuels may 
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seem insignificant today, but such oils may become, in the course of time, as 
important as petroleum and the coal-tar products of the present time….Motor power 
can still be produced from the heat of the sun, always available, even when the natural 
stores of solid and liquid fuels are completely exhausted” (Diesel, 1913: 1605). 
However, Diesel’s untimely death in 1913 and the growing abundance of cheap 
petroleum fuel largely ended research on vegetable-oil fuels.  
It was not until the late 1970s, as oil prices sky rocketed and fuel shortages 
loomed, that government agencies and academic researchers again began investigating 
vegetable oil as potential fuel source. Starting in 1979, a number of academics such as 
Dr. Charles Peterson at the University of Idaho and Dr. Leon Schumacher at the 
University of Missouri began conducting vegetable oil alkyl-ester experiments in 
diesel engines. Despite the ample amount of research and development performed at 
the university level, the biodiesel industry may never have developed as it has today 
without the channeling of entrepreneurial attention to this new organizational form by 
agriculture trade associations. Because trade associations are always looking for 
opportunities to expand the market for their member firms, once they discover a new 
use for their products, they proceed to promote those new applications using a number 
of tactics to legitimate the new product use.  
In 1990, the Missouri Soybean Association, found out about the alkyl ester 
research being conducted in Dr. Schumacher’s lab at the University of Missouri. 
When the association learned that Schumacher was trying to make a biodiesel out of 
grape seed oil, association members contacted him and suggested that he try using 
soybean oil instead. Schumacher consented, and the Missouri Soybean Association 
began sponsoring his research. After a number of successful soybean alkyl-ester tests, 
the Missouri Soybean Association began promoting the soybean alkyl-ester 
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technology developed in Dr. Schumacher’s laboratory as the production technology 
entrepreneurs should adopt when founding a biodiesel refinery.  
Other agriculture industry associations learned of other types of plant and 
animal oils that could serve as raw materials for biodiesel and also entered the fray, 
seeking out and sponsoring university research, and endorsing biodiesel production 
designs that utilized agriculture products harvested by their members. For example, 
the U.S. Canola Association endorsed technologies that used canola oil while the 
National Renderers Association drew attention to technologies that utilized animal 
tallow and the National Corn Growers Association advocated technologies that 
employed corn oil as a biodiesel raw material. State trade association members 
attended agriculture conferences, county fairs, and other public venues to discuss and 
demonstrate the new technology. After filling up buses, tractors, and trucks, with 
biodiesel, they would drive thousands of miles across county roads, garnering much 
attention. They would often bring university scientists to testify of the particular 
technology’s effectiveness and appropriateness.  
Thus, while all the agriculture associations in this study shared a common 
concern with the biodiesel sector, they also promoted varying production technologies 
depending on the industry members they represented. Because the application of soap-
making technologies to biodiesel production was very new and entrepreneurs could 
not simply conduct a cost-benefit analysis of which technological production process 
they should adopt, the influence of agriculture trade associations promoting the “best” 
technology likely had a large influence on the decision of entrepreneurs to found a 
firm and to adopt or develop a production process.  
Institutional Actors and Entrepreneurial Decision-Making 
Entrepreneurs endeavoring to start an organization in a new sector with a 
variety of unproven technologies face a number of challenges. First, they must decide 
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to enter into an emerging sector characterized by high uncertainty and little cognitive 
and sociopolitical legitimacy. Second, they are presented with the dilemma of 
choosing an uncertain technology that will have a long and successful trajectory. In 
every new technology cycle, eras of substitution and direct competition occur wherein 
emerging technologies vie to become the accepted market standard or dominant design 
(Abernathy and Utterback, 1978), with practices enjoying the greatest support among 
government, professions and other organizations becoming ascendant (Rao, 1998).  
During the early-cycle period, entrepreneurs must sort through unproven 
practices and select or develop a technology that has the greatest probability of 
surviving the competition (Anderson and Tushman, 1990). After founding a firm and 
deciding on a technology, they face the challenge of convincing key constituents such 
as creditors, investors, suppliers, and buyers that their sector and product or service 
rendered from the new technology is appropriate and desirable. If the sector or 
technology lacks substantial cognitive and sociopolitical legitimacy, entrepreneurs will 
find it difficult to obtain the resources they need to start and grow their organization 
(Aldrich and Fiol, 1994; Suchman, 1995). Yet, given the high uncertainties regarding 
industries and technologies in the beginning of new markets, understanding the factors 
that impact entrepreneurs’ decisions to start a firm and choose a technology may help 
better explain how multiple actors promoting various organizational practices and 
technologies may affect entrepreneurial activity.  
Some scholars argue that an entrepreneur’s decision to start a venture or 
choose a technology is highly rational, based on expected demands and potential 
profits, technology life cycle age, density of competitors, availability and cost of 
resources, and market demand (Schumpeter, 1934; Simon, 1947; Kirzner, 1973; 
Hannan and Freeman, 1977; Blau, 1987; Dunne, Roberts, and Larry, 1988; Evans and 
Jovanovic, 1989; Tushman and Anderson, 1986; Evans, 1989; Hayek, 1949). While 
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these studies provide a foundation to understand how entrepreneurs make decisions, 
they largely fail to address how entrepreneurs make choices when faced with high 
uncertainty and information asymmetry, and they suggest a single-direction path in 
which individuals first decide to become entrepreneurs and then look for opportunities 
to make a profit, when the emergence of new opportunities could induce individuals to 
become entrepreneurs.  
Other scholars assert that entrepreneurs make rationally bounded decisions and 
that unsettled and ambiguous circumstances can increase the influence of social 
structures on entrepreneurial decision-making (Simon, 1947; Sine, Haveman, and 
Tobert, 2005; Hargrave and Van de Ven, 2006). As uncertainty and lack of 
information increase, social structures can provide entrepreneurs with an automatic 
response to a variety of choices (Simon, 1947). For example, a number of sociological 
studies suggests that past education and research experiences (Shane, 2000) as well as 
previous employment environments (Burton, Sorensen, and Beckman, 2002; Phillips, 
2002; Dobrev and Barnett, 2005; Sorensen, 2007) provide structures that shape 
entrepreneurs’ cognition and choice of the type of form their new organization should 
take (Tolbert, David, and Sine, 2010). While these studies illustrate an important 
source of social structure, this approach ignores the fact that entrepreneurs do not 
always reproduce the kinds of organizations in which they were employed. Otherwise 
there would be little innovation or movement of entrepreneurs from one industry to 
another.  
Another social influence recently explored by organizational scholars that can 
affect entrepreneurial decision-making is that of institutional actors (Swaminathan and 
Wade, 2001; Sine and Lee, 2009). In particular, highly endowed and organized 
individual or collective actors, such as professional associations, trade associations or 
social movement organizations can engage in institutionalization projects to promote 
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the acceptance of a new practice or technology by diffusing information, advocating 
the passage of laws and regulations, and “framing issues and problems, and mobilizing 
constituencies” in an effort to “infuse new beliefs, norms, and values into social 
structures” (Rao, Morrill, and Zald, 2000: 240), resulting in the formation of new 
entrepreneurial opportunities, organizational forms, industries, or associated 
institutions (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983; DiMaggio, 1988; Lounsbury, 2001; 
Schneiberg, 2002). As institutional actors promote the adoption of new institutional 
beliefs, values, and regulations, they augment the cognitive and sociopolitical 
legitimacy of the emerging practice and shape individuals’ understanding of the new 
technology, which can increase their inclination to exploit an opportunity and found a 
firm (Aldrich and Fiol, 1994; Sine, Haveman, and Tolbert, 2005). 
Actor Heterogeneity, Entrepreneurial Foundings and Technological Diversity 
One way institutional scholars have tried to explain institutional change and 
organizational heterogeneity has been by focusing on the collective mobilization of 
professions, social movement organizations, and other political actors as key players 
in enacting change (Greenwood and Suddaby, 2006; Scott, 2008; Weber, Heinz, and 
DeSoucey, 2008). These studies have largely explained organizational or practice 
variation as a result of actor strength, asserting that as a given institutional actor 
increases in power, so does its ability to influence the adoption or emergence of a 
specific practice or organizational form. By focusing on one actor promoting a single 
practice or form, they restrict practice variability to a binary outcome: organizations 
either implement the original practice or the new one. We know very little about how 
institutional actors can affect the emergence or adoption of multiple organizational 
forms or practices, which often characterize the early periods or ferment stage of the 
technological lifecycle. Moreover, studies that narrowly focus on a single institutional 
actor may overlook other actors that are contributing to changes in the cultural-
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cognitive environment. Hence, by studying actor heterogeneity we can increase our 
understanding of how competition among institutional actors can foment 
entrepreneurial activity and organizational heterogeneity.  
A handful of studies have investigated how varying institutional logics or 
values impact organizations using empirical contexts such as universities (Albert and 
Whetten, 1985), public broadcasters (Powell, 1988), multi-national firms (Kostova and 
Zaheer, 1999), and banks (Marquis and Lounsbury, 2007). Many of these studies 
assert that organizations react to greater institutional pluralism by growing in size and 
adding additional administrative functions (Meyer and Rowan, 1977; Meyer and Scott, 
1983). For example, in a study of U.S. telephone companies, Barnett and Carroll 
(1993) found that greater fragmentation of regulatory pressures from federal, state, and 
local laws increased the size of telephone companies as these organizations created 
structures to deal with the additional demands. Other studies have noted that some 
organizations facing complex environments react by creating customized identities for 
each constituent. For example, Kraatz and Block (2008) found that universities, facing 
pluralistic institutional pressures from businesses and students, created multiple 
identities in an effort to maintain legitimacy but not without a cost. The multiple 
identities caused deep-rooted tensions among departments and faculty members. 
Nevertheless, these studies are limited in that they focus on traditional firms in 
established markets and overlook the efforts of multiple, competing institutional actors 
in producing institutional change at the beginning of new sectors and technology 
lifecycles.  
In this study, I propose that the presence of diverse actors promoting different 
kinds of practices and technologies can have a significant effect on entrepreneurial 
activity and technological variation by appealing to a broad variety of individual tastes 
and their available resources. Regarding the first mechanism, individuals have varying 
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tastes and values, and just as diversity among organizational forms generates greater 
appeal to diverse population segments (Sørensen and Sorenson, 2007), an assortment 
of promoted technologies and forms may resound with a greater variety of potential 
entrepreneurs leading to increased foundings. The recent growth of charter schools 
provides an example of how varying choices in organizational forms can appeal to 
different sets of entrepreneurs and provide opportunities for organizational emergence. 
Charter schools are publicly supported schools that are run privately and are based on 
various teaching philosophies such as military education, foreign language immersion, 
or whole child. The variety in pedagogy philosophies can motivate a broad range of 
entrepreneurs to found distinct charter schools espousing those viewpoints. For 
example, not long after Chicago allowed charter schools, between 1997 and 2008 over 
67 different charter schools representing a variety of teaching philosophies were 
founded (Brown and Gutstein, 2009).  
Second, individuals have access to different sets of resources, which can affect 
their decision to found a firm. Education, social networks, and prior experiences affect 
access to knowledge, capital, and the kinds of employees they can hire. For example 
during the emergence of the automobile industry, technologies related to steam, coal 
gasification, electricity, and petroleum provided opportunities for entrepreneurs 
familiar with and/or had access to such technologies and resources to found firms and 
produce automobiles that were propelled using a variety of these locomotive 
technologies (Eckermann, 2001). Additionally, in the electricity generation sector, 
many of the entrepreneurs who started wind-power facilities after the industry became 
deregulated did so because wind technology appealed to their environmental values 
and complemented their educational background in mechanical engineering (Sine and 
Lee, 2009).  
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In the context of the U.S. biodiesel sector, in areas where a heterogeneous 
group of institutional actors such as agriculture trade associations promote soybean 
feedstock technologies as well as poultry fat feedstock technologies, both individuals 
who have an affinity towards and/or have access to soybeans and those who are drawn 
to the idea of using animal rendered products and/or have access to those raw 
materials and technologies may be enticed to become entrepreneurs and found new 
firms. An example of this is Earl-Fisher biofuels of Montana. While the founders had 
heard about biodiesel before, it wasn’t until they were exposed to the promotion of 
canola oil feedstock technologies at a farmer’s union conference that Brett Earl and 
Logan Fisher became excited to found a firm and began making plans for their facility. 
Their motivation was based largely on the fit of the technology with Fisher’s 
background—he was a canola farmer and thus had greater access and knowledge 
about this particular raw material than other kinds of oilseed crops. Another example 
is Agrifuels, LLC of Ohio. The founders related that they started a biodiesel facility 
that used soybean technologies because they believed that their customers who were 
primarily soybean farmers would rather buy biodiesel made from soybeans than any 
other kind of raw material.  
 In sum, because entrepreneurs espouse a variety of preferences and have 
access to different types of resources, the promotion and legitimation of diverse 
technologies at the beginning of new sectors and technological lifecycles should have 
a significant positive effect on new foundings. Consequently, as new ventures adopt a 
variety of promoted technologies, the technological variation in a given region should 
also increase. Thus, I argue: 
Hypothesis 1: Biodiesel foundings will increase as the heterogeneity of 
competing trade associations increases.  
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Hypothesis 2: Technological diversity among biodiesel foundings will increase 
as the heterogeneity of competing trade associations increases.  
 
Yet, the effect of actor variation on new-venture foundings and technological 
diversity may be moderated by the strength or size of the institutional actors involved. 
Past research suggests that the more powerful the actors, the greater the influence they 
will have on individuals and organizations to adopt the promoted technology or 
practice (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978; Lounsbury, 2001; Sine and Lee, 2009). For 
example, Schneiberg and colleagues (2008) found that greater numbers of Grange 
members in a given state increased the anti-corporate movement’s power and ability to 
change cultural values and beliefs regarding organizational forms, thereby leading to 
greater foundings of cooperatives. Likewise, Hiatt and colleagues (2009) found that 
greater numbers of Woman’s Christian Temperance Union members in a given state 
increased the temperance movement’s ability to deinstitutionalize the consumption of 
alcohol, thereby leading to greater brewery failures. Because actor strength has been 
shown to be positively correlated with their ability to change cultural and cognitive 
beliefs, I propose that the impact of institutional actor heterogeneity on entrepreneurial 
activity and technological variation will be amplified by the strength or size of the 
total actors of interest.  
Hypothesis 3: The impact of trade association heterogeneity on biodiesel 
foundings will be positively moderated by the net size (strength) of the trade 
associations promoting different technologies. 
Hypothesis 4: The impact of trade association heterogeneity on technological 
variation will be positively moderated by the net size (strength) of the trade 
associations promoting different technologies. 
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Actor Heterogeneity and Development of Innovative Technologies 
At the same time, institutional actor heterogeneity may also impact the 
entrepreneurs’ decision of either adopting a promoted technology or choosing to 
combine technologies, thereby creating a novel, proprietary technological process. A 
number of early scholars suggested that complex environments characterized by 
conflicting cultures, ideas, values, and beliefs can function as a stimulus for creativity 
and innovation among organizations (Baldridge and Burnham, 1975). For instance, 
Coser (1957) argued that conflict exerts “pressure for innovation and creativity” and 
that the “clash of values and interests, the tension between what is and what some 
groups feel ought to be, the conflict between vested interests and new strata…[are] 
productive of vitality…and burst[s] of creativity” (197-198). Dewey (1930) stated that 
“conflict is the gadfly of thought. It stirs us to observation and memory. It instigates to 
invention. It shocks us out of sheep-like passivity, and sets us at noting and 
contriving….Conflict is a sine qua non of reflection and ingenuity” (300). 
Additionally, Powell (1991), asserted that “novel recombinations may occur” among 
“organizations located in complex environments, particularly those subject to both 
strong institutional and technological pressures” (199).  
 A number of historical accounts seem to support these theoretical assertions. 
For example, some historians argue that cross-cultural contact from the Christian 
Crusades was a source of innovation and a major impetus behind the renaissance and 
moving Western Europe out of the dark ages because it exposed knights to Arab 
beliefs and knowledge in mathematics, engineering, and physics. One writer noted: 
The Crusades…re-established traffic between the East and West, which, after 
having been suspended for several centuries, was then resumed with even 
greater energy; they were the means of bringing from the depths of their 
respective provinces and introducing into the most civilized Asiatic countries 
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Western knights, to whom a new world was thus revealed, and who returned to 
their native land filled with novel ideas…. The development of general culture 
in the West was the direct result of these Holy Wars (Brehier, 1907: 556). 
 
Similarly, Galison (1997) has written how cooperative work among individuals 
from different intellectual backgrounds can foment creativity and innovation. He 
provides as an example how the collaboration between engineers and physicists—each 
of different subcultures, training, and expertise—produced theoretical propositions 
describing radar and later together created a functioning prototype of radar during 
World War II. In sum, while a number of theoretical and historical accounts provide 
strong evidence of a general relation between complex environments and innovation, 
there are very few empirical studies that demonstrate how fragmented environments 
can affect the kinds of technologies entrepreneurs will adopt or develop. Applying 
work by social psychologists may provide a fruitful framework of how institutional 
actors promoting differing ideas and fragmenting the cultural and cognitive 
environment can affect new-firm creativity and innovation.  
Research in social psychology suggests that environments characterized by 
diverse concepts and values can encourage creative performance (Simonton, 1975) by 
exposing individuals to a broad range of views and ideas (Mendelsohn and Griswold, 
1964; Toplyn and Maguire, 1991; Amabile, 1996; Kasof, 1997). Campbell (1960) 
noted that creativity results when an individual receives a wide variety of inputs and 
engages in a high rate of selectivity to decide which of the alternatives to retain. As 
individuals select certain inputs and evaluate them, they “bring into contiguity 
otherwise separate streams of mental activity” that can facilitate “the combinatorial 
leap which is generally described as the hallmark of creativity” (Mendelsohn, 1976: 
366). Expounding further on this mechanism, Martindale explained:  
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The more elements that a person can focus on simultaneously, the more likely 
that a creative idea will result. Why? Because the more elements that can be 
focused on, the more candidates there are for combinations. Thus, with two 
elements—A and B—in the focus of attention, only one relationship—AB—can 
be discovered. With three elements—A, B, and C—there are three potential 
relationships—AB, AC, and BC—to be discovered. With four elements, there 
are six potential relationships, and so on (1981: 372). 
 
Consequently, as entrepreneurs are exposed to a variety of values, ideas, and 
practices, they may engage in greater concept selection, retention, and evaluation, 
leading to a recombination of ideas (Simonton, 1988), which, according to many 
technology scholars, can be the foundation for innovative practices (Gilfillan, 1935). 
For instance, Schumpeter observed that “innovation combines components in a new 
way, or that it consists in carrying out new combinations” (1939: 88). Likewise, 
Nelson and Winter stated that “the creation of any sort of novelty in the art, science, or 
practical life—consists to a substantial extent of a recombination of conceptual and 
physical materials that were previously in existence” (1982: 130). Thus, as the 
heterogeneity of institutional actors promoting different concepts, values, and ideas 
increases, so should the rate of innovation among new ventures. 
An example of how heterogeneity of actors can spur recombinatorial 
innovation is provided by Michigan Biodiesel. In sorting through and considering the 
many different promoted technologies, CEO John Oakley reported that the founding 
team decided to develop a technological process that combined soybean, sunflower 
and poultry fat feedstock technologies. Part of that process included designing 
proprietary batch-flow processes with multiple self-cleaning tanks in order to reduce 
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contamination from varying raw materials and allow for a more precise and efficient 
transesterification (Oakley, 2007).   
The founding of ECO Friendly Products in 2007 offers another example. Two 
partners decided to found a biodiesel company in their home-state of Texas. Because it 
was during a period in which institutional actor competition in the state was relatively 
high, they were exposed to many kinds of promoted technologies. After taking some 
time evaluating existing technologies, they developed an innovative technology that 
combined the feedstock technology of waste vegetable oil with a municipal waste 
gasification process. The result was an innovative recombinatorial technology that 
produced biodiesel composed of methyl esters and n-butanol. The added ingredient of 
butanol actually helped diesel engines burn cleaner and more efficiently than regular 
biodiesel.  
As diverse institutional actors advocate different technologies and issues, the 
cultural-cognitive environment can become fragmented, providing entrepreneurs with 
a wide repertoire of technologies and values to retain and evaluate. Consequently, in 
areas where the competition of trade associations is high, entrepreneurs may engage 
more in evaluative and recombinatorial processes in an effort to find the technological 
design that is best suited for their firm, leading to the development of innovative 
combinatorial production capabilities. Thus I posit:  
Hypothesis 5: Development of innovative recombinatorial technologies among 
biodiesel foundings will increase as the heterogeneity of trade associations 
promoting competing technologies increases. 
 
The effect of actor heterogeneity on innovative recombinatorial technologies 
may also be moderated by the strength or size of the actors involved. Just as larger 
institutional actor size may translate into a greater ability to influence individuals and 
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organizations (Sine and Lee, 2009; Hiatt, Sine, and Tolbert, 2009), greater size of the 
total competing actors may have a positive moderating impact on environmental 
complexity. The result of which may translate into more technological recombinations 
at the new-venture level. Thus, 
Hypothesis 6: The effect of institutional actor heterogeneity on the 
development of recombinatorial technologies will be positively moderated by 
the net size (strength) of trade associations promoting different technologies. 
 
Methods 
In this study, I focus on the effects of institutional actor heterogeneity and 
strength on the emergence of new kinds of organizations and on technological 
adoption, innovation and diversity. Empirically, I measure the impact of competing 
agriculture trade associations on biodiesel foundings and technological variety. The 
window of observation is 1990 to 2008. I use 1990 as the base year because that is the 
year that agriculture trade associations began sponsoring biodiesel university research 
and promoting such technologies and I end data collection on December 31, 2008. A 
total of 267 biodiesel production plants were founded during this period. 
Dependent Variables. The dependent variables for this study are state-level 
founding events of biodiesel producers, state-level founding events of biodiesel 
producers that innovatively recombined technologies, and the degree of technological 
diversity of newly founded firms in a given state-year. Data on biodiesel producers 
come from quarterly reports generated by the National Biodiesel Board as well as 
archival reports from individual producers. From this information I am able to 
measure when each biodiesel plant began and ceased operation, the total number of 
biodiesel plants operating in a state, their total production capacity, and the feedstock 
technology they used over time.  
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I measured technological variation by using a Blau (1977) index as modeled by 
(1 - ∑pit2) where p is the proportion of biodiesel producers using a certain feedstock 
production technology in a state and year t, and i is the number of different types of 
technologies used by biodiesel producers in the state. There is a moderately high 
retooling cost associated with changing production feedstock technologies. On 
average, biodiesel producers that had the resources to change technological designs in 
order to utilize other kinds of raw materials were forced to idle their plants for about a 
year. Because of this, entrepreneurs are highly motivated to pick the best production 
design from the start. A total of twenty-three different biodiesel production 
technologies were developed and adopted by biodiesel producers over the eighteen-
year time period. I measured combinatorial technological innovation by indicating 
whether the producer was founded with an innovative recombinatory technology 
within a given state.  
Key Predictor Variables. Agriculture trade associations promoted new 
organizational forms and technologies based on the belief that as entrepreneurs 
founded biodiesel facilities and adopted technologies that required organic feedstocks, 
they would boost demand and increase commodity prices of the agricultural products 
their members produced. I contacted all agriculture trade associations that represent 
producers of organic oils in the United States to find out whether they had promoted 
biodiesel. Six trade associations reported to have actively promoted biodiesel, namely, 
the American Soybean Association, National Renderers Association, United States 
Canola Association, National Corn Growers Association, National Sunflower 
Association, and the National Cottonseed Producers Association. Because many of 
these organizations are federative in nature, the state chapters are free to decide when 
and what they will promote. I contacted every state and national organization and 
obtained information on their membership, the dates of when the state chapters and 
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national organizations began endorsing biodiesel as well as information on the 
promotion tactics they used. Because information on promotion tactics was limited, I 
left them out of the analysis. 
I captured the effect of greater trade association competition in a state on 
biodiesel foundings, technology diversity among new foundings, and innovation by 
using a Blau (1977) heterogeneity index. Because heterogeneity measures the size or 
strength of a particular trade association in relation to other competing associations, 
the more equal in size and strength (i.e. greater heterogeneity), the more entrepreneurs 
will be exposed to varying promoted ideas and technologies at an equal rate. In 
contrast, greater trade association homogeneity may result in a dominant promoted 
technology that could muffle any competitive technologies. The variable is modeled as 
(1 - ∑pi2) where p is the proportion of members of a trade association, and i is the 
number of different kinds of trade associations represented in the state in year t.6
Control Variables. I controlled for gross state product per capita, state 
population density, and acres of farmland density. Information on state population 
comes from the U.S. Census Bureau, while data on gross state product and acres of 
farmland are obtained from the U.S. Departments of Commerce and Agriculture, 
respectively. I also controlled for the amount of relevant human capital by calculating 
the number of people in each state employed in technical fields relevant to biodiesel 
technology. Biodiesel production requires various types of knowledge related to the 
chemistry and chemical engineering fields. Using the SIC code as a guide, I included 
employment data on chemists and chemical engineers from the Covered Employment 
 Thus, 
a score of 1 would denote perfect heterogeneity while a score of 0 would indicate 
perfect homogeneity.  
                                                 
6 I also created a count variable by summing the total number of trade associations in a 
given state and year and found similar results.  
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and Wages Program compiled by the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics. Once the two 
major field variables were interpolated, I added the number of workers in these two 
groups by state to obtain the aggregate number of technical workers with skills and 
knowledge relevant to biodiesel production.  
Because local access to biodiesel raw materials can affect the decision of 
entrepreneurs to found a biodiesel plant (Baker and Nelson, 2005; Sine and Lee, 
2009), I controlled for the total amount of locally available raw materials and their 
price by summing the total pounds of animal fats, plant oils and waste vegetable oil 
(yellow grease) produced by state. I calculated the pounds of rendered animal fats by 
taking the pounds of pigs, cattle, and poultry slaughtered by state and computing the 
average percent of rendered fat per animal as determined by the National Renderers 
Association (Meeker, 2006). I calculated the amount of plant oils by summing the total 
bushels of sunflower, safflower, canola, rapeseed, soybean, corn, peanuts, cottonseed, 
and flaxseed harvested in a state and computing the average pounds of oil derived 
from each type of seed as determined by the United States Department of 
Agriculture’s (USDA) National Agricultural Statistical Service. The data reveal the 
annual amount of crops harvested and animals slaughtered and the commodity prices 
for each type of oil and fat by year. As a measure of the pounds of waste vegetable oil 
produced by state, I counted the total number of food establishments per state and 
multiplied this by 372 pounds per month, the average amount of waste vegetable oil 
discarded by a restaurant (Vernet, 2005). The number of food service establishments 
comes from the U.S. Census Bureau’s Economic Census.  
Because diversity of raw materials as well as the price could affect 
technological diversity of new ventures as well as the development of innovative 
recombinatorial technologies, I controlled for the heterogeneity of locally available 
raw materials by constructing a Blau index variable of the following locally available 
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oilseed crops as mentioned above in a state: sunflower, safflower, canola, rapeseed, 
soybean, corn, peanuts, cottonseed, flaxseed, animal fats, and waste vegetable oil. 
Following previous research (Carroll and Hannan, 2000), I included a measure of 
industry age as the time since the first biodiesel refinery was founded. 
Prior studies have found that organizational density can affect the amount of 
available resources and thereby influence new-venture foundings and the propensity to 
innovate (Hannan and Freeman, 1977; Katila and Shane, 2005). As such, I controlled 
for competition by summing the number of operating biodiesel plants in each state by 
year. I also controlled for state regulatory environment by constructing two variables 
that capture state biodiesel production mandates and biodiesel-specific production 
incentives. I measured state biodiesel production mandates and production incentive 
laws by placing a “1” if a state had in place production mandates or incentive laws and 
“0” if it did not. Production mandates included state laws that mandated a certain 
percentage of biodiesel be produced in a state and blended with petroleum fuel at local 
gas pumps. Incentive policies included state tax credits for biodiesel production, state 
grants for the construction of biodiesel refineries, biodiesel blending credits, and 
reduced excise tax on biodiesel sales. Following previous studies, I also controlled for 
spillover effects of biodiesel density and regulation in surrounding states by creating 
variables that captured the total number of biodiesel plants in operation and the 
proportion of surrounding state mandates and state incentives (Wade, Swaminathan, 
and Saxon, 1998). I obtained data on these policies from U.S. Department of Energy’s 
Alternative Fuels and Advanced Vehicles Data Center (1990-2008) and from federal 
and state code books.  
Given that profitability can affect the decision of entrepreneurs to adopt a 
particular technological process, I controlled for profitability in the models of 
founding, technological innovation and diversity by taking the average price of retail 
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diesel sold in a state and subtracting it from the sum of the average cost of labor, 
capital, and chemical transesterification costs (methanol), and the annual average price 
of biodiesel raw materials per gallon using a weighted index score of feedstock spot 
prices recorded by the USDA’s National Agricultural Statistical Service. I obtained 
data on state average retail diesel prices from U.S. Department of Energy and 
information on the average cost of labor and capital from reports from biodiesel 
analysts (Van Gerpen, Pruszko, Clements, Shanks, and Knothe, 2006).  
I also controlled for the 2005 federal subsidy of biodiesel using a dummy 
variable in the founding and technology innovation and diversity analyses. This 
subsidy provided a tax credit of $1.00 per gallon for technologies that transformed 
oilseed crops into biodiesel and $.50 per gallon for technologies that transformed 
animal fats and yellow grease into biodiesel for the years 2005 through 2008. I also 
controlled for biodiesel potential demand by calculating the amount of diesel 
consumption. These data came from the U.S. Department of Energy.  
Finally, I supplemented archival data with thirty-two interviews with biodiesel 
founders and twenty-six interviews with agriculture trade associations and 
environmental movement organization members across the nation. The interview data 
grounded my choice of measures and strengthened my understanding of hypothesized 
structural relationships.  
Analysis 
To test the relationship between institutional actor heterogeneity and the rate of 
entrepreneurial activity (founding events) and recombinatorial technology founding 
events by state, I used a piece-wise exponential hazard model, thereby maximizing the 
use of available information (Carroll and Hannan, 2000). This analysis does not 
require strong parametric assumptions of a constant failure over rate the model’s time 
 80 
 
span but allows the hazard rate to change at multiple intervals, allowing for greater 
flexibility (Blossfeld and Rohwer, 1995). The model has the general form of:  
r(t) = exp(αi + βα)   
where αl  is a constant coefficient associated with the ith time interval, β is a row vector 
of covariates and α is an associated vector of coefficients. I estimated the piecewise 
failure model with period effects in roughly five-year intervals (1990-1994, 1995-1999, 
2000-2004, and 2005-2008). I chose five-year time periods because I felt it was best at 
approximating changes in the baseline rate as well as avoiding estimation problems 
that may occur from too few founding episodes within the time period (Blossfeld, 
Golsch, Rohwer, 2007). The piecewise exponential model generates a period-specific 
constant (a “y-intercept”) for each designated time piece of the model. I used 
maximum likelihood estimation and the Huber-White-sandwich estimator of variance, 
which clusters observations on states, to produce robust standard errors.7
Results 
  
Descriptive statistics and bivariate correlations are provided in table 8. 
Twenty-nine states had three or more competing trade associations and 19 states had 
Blau index scores of above .50, indicating moderate to high levels of institutional actor 
heterogeneity. The first biodiesel founding occurred in 1993 in Missouri, with one or 
two more a year in a few other states. Foundings began to increase beginning in 2002 
and by 2007, the states averaged 1.70 foundings per year with Texas leading the way 
with 8.5 foundings per year. The hazard model predicting biodiesel founding events 
and recombinatorial technology founding events is provided in tables 9 and 10 and the 
general least squares regression predicting technological diversity is provided in table 
11. Turning to the measures of actor heterogeneity and interactions on biodiesel 
                                                 
7 I also replicated this analysis in a fixed effects model and Cox hazard model and 
found similar results.   
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foundings and recombinatorial technology in table 9, the first model contains the 
control variables; the second model adds the strength of a particular trade association 
promoting a specific technology as measured by membership; the third model adds the 
impact of opposition variety on foundings and recombinatorial technology founding 
events; and the fourth model adds the interaction of trade association strength 
(membership) with trade association heterogeneity.  
Several of the control variables had a significant impact on new venture start-
up. Raw material availability, state mandate laws, and to a lesser extent federal 
subsidy and state diesel consumption all positively impacted biodiesel foundings, 
while industry age had a negative impact on foundings, consistent with prior 
expectations. Interestingly, biodiesel profitability (diesel price minus raw material 
prices) was negatively correlated with biodiesel foundings. Since 2004, the price for 
organic oils from soybeans, restaurant traps, and animals, etc., has risen higher than 
the price of petroleum, thereby squeezing production margins and making the industry 
almost entirely unprofitable if it were not for state and federal subsidies. Quite 
possibly, expectations that government will continue subsidizing production coupled 
with institutional actor support for founding a firm may be what are driving 
entrepreneurial interest in a largely unprofitable sector. 
The results provide general support of hypotheses 1 and 5. Coefficients in 
model four of table 9 indicate that a greater heterogeneity of institutional actors 
increased biodiesel foundings, thereby supporting hypothesis 1. In model 3 of table 10, 
results show that institutional actor heterogeneity increased foundings of biodiesel 
ventures with recombinatorial technologies, thereby supporting hypothesis 5. 
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Table 8 
 
Descriptive Statistics and Bivariate Correlations 
 
 
  Variable Mean Std. Dev. 
1 State technological diversity 0.178 0.254 
2 State population density 293 1108 
3 Gross state product  178229 222472 
4 Available raw materials 1200000000 1830000000 
5 Raw material heterogeneity 0.524 0.222 
6 Farmland density 0.249 0.172 
7 Chemical engineers  18094 22770 
8 Industry age 9 5.480 
9 
State diesel consumption (thousands of 
barrels/year) 25570 21410 
10 Biodiesel profitability (cents) -113.022 42.052 
11 Biodiesel density 0.118 0.503 
12 Surrounding state biodiesel density 0.570 1.682 
13 State biodiesel production incentive laws 0.076 0.266 
14 State biodiesel production mandate laws 0.010 0.101 
15 
Surrounding state biodiesel production incentive 
laws 0.072 0.170 
16 
Surrounding state biodiesel production mandate 
laws 0.010 0.051 
17 Federal subsidy 0.263 0.441 
18 Total trade associations' membership 1035 2172 
19 Trade association variety 0.321 0.216 
20 
Trade association variety * Trade associations' 
membership 576 1128 
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Table 8 (Continued) 
 
 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
1 1 
      2 -0.080 1 
     3 0.292 0.321 1 
    4 -0.100 -0.154 -0.031 1 
   5 0.205 -0.044 0.257 0.017 1 
  6 -0.140 -0.403 -0.174 0.676 0.287 1 
 7 0.111 0.505 0.807 0.108 0.255 -0.060 1 
8 0.444 0.119 0.057 -0.273 0.119 -0.384 -0.037 
9 0.298 0.224 0.875 0.007 0.358 -0.020 0.818 
10 0.008 0.064 0.062 -0.219 -0.120 -0.290 -0.056 
11 0.397 -0.145 0.299 -0.019 0.253 0.162 0.194 
12 0.334 -0.256 -0.246 -0.023 0.153 0.093 -0.251 
13 0.204 -0.009 -0.018 0.002 0.199 0.023 -0.016 
14 0.090 -0.041 0.034 0.082 0.080 -0.048 -0.071 
15 0.373 -0.089 -0.081 0.021 0.140 0.020 -0.070 
16 0.322 -0.024 -0.023 -0.037 0.084 -0.065 -0.021 
17 0.370 0.130 0.035 -0.267 0.127 -0.356 -0.074 
18 -0.094 -0.135 -0.092 0.919 -0.041 0.535 0.010 
19 0.059 -0.221 -0.182 0.259 0.086 0.356 -0.151 
20 -0.116 -0.143 -0.119 0.911 -0.053 0.543 -0.019 
 
 
  8 9 10 11 12 13 14 
8 1 
      9 0.064 1 
     10 0.351 0.002 1 
    11 0.142 0.381 -0.051 1 
   12 0.435 -0.164 -0.008 0.200 1 
  13 0.390 -0.002 0.028 0.075 0.237 1 
 14 0.164 0.034 -0.046 0.078 0.099 0.134 1 
15 0.587 -0.032 -0.060 0.198 0.467 0.409 0.128 
16 0.355 -0.006 -0.134 0.215 0.281 0.153 0.048 
17 0.851 0.028 0.425 0.130 0.367 0.334 0.116 
18 -0.247 -0.095 -0.185 -0.072 -0.054 -0.039 0.114 
19 -0.058 -0.016 -0.085 0.151 -0.030 0.057 -0.054 
20 -0.250 -0.109 -0.187 -0.070 -0.065 -0.051 0.118 
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Table 8 (Continued) 
 
 
  15 16 17 18 19 
15 1 
    16 0.398 1 
   17 0.492 0.243 1 
  18 -0.015 -0.027 -0.240 1 
 19 0.077 -0.085 -0.063 0.222 1 
20 -0.018 -0.033 -0.242 0.995 0.253 
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Table 9 
Piecewise Exponential Model of Biodiesel Founding Events by State-Year 
          
Variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
1990-1994† -18.655 -17.149 -14.636 -14.568 
 (1.394) (1.428) 1.742303 (1.765) 
1995-1999 -13.162 -11.690 -11.748 -11.669 
 (1.514) (1.612) (1.855) (1.906) 
2000-2004 -9.812 -8.344 -8.434 -8.355 
 (1.860) (1.887) (1.988) (2.029) 
2005-2008 -6.191 -4.741 -4.759 -4.678 
 (2.048) (2.067) (2.144) (2.190) 
Population density -0.000 -0.000* -0.000 -0.000 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Gross state product (in millions) -0.219 -0.291** 0.058 0.050 
 (0.153) (0.147) (0.202) (0.228) 
Available raw materials (logged) 0.223*** 0.137** 0.134* 0.131* 
 (0.059) (0.064) (0.073) (0.077) 
Raw material heterogeneity -0.448 -0.283 0.104 0.111 
 (0.520) (0.514) (0.658) (0.658) 
Farmland density 0.333 0.197 0.265 0.268 
 (0.377) (0.381) (0.383) (0.386) 
Chemical engineers / 100,000 -0.116 -0.378 -0.743 -0.725 
 (0.538) (0.494) (0.491) (0.475) 
Industry age -0.335*** -0.329*** -0.376*** -0.375*** 
 (0.114) (0.115) (0.110) (0.110) 
State diesel consumption (millions of 
barrels/year) 0.007 0.010** 0.008* 0.009* 
 (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 
Biodiesel profitability (cents) -0.010*** -0.011*** -0.010*** -0.010*** 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Biodiesel density 0.117* 0.113* 0.092 0.092 
 (0.065) (0.069) (0.063) (0.064) 
Surrounding state biodiesel density 0.007 0.011 0.030 0.029 
 (0.029) (0.029) (0.028) (0.030) 
State biodiesel production incentive 
laws -0.188 -0.192 -0.211 -0.215* 
 (0.123) (0.130) (0.132) (0.130) 
State biodiesel production mandate 
laws 0.713*** 0.602*** 0.707*** 0.711*** 
 (0.188) (0.206) (0.173) (0.172) 
Surrounding state biodiesel production 
incentive laws -0.079 -0.030 -0.022 -0.025 
 (0.278) (0.279) (0.260) (0.271) 
Surrounding state biodiesel production 
mandate laws 0.100 -0.022 0.279 0.263 
 (0.455) (0.484) (0.500) (0.551) 
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Table 9 (Continued)  
 
 
 
Federal subsidy 1.060* 0.997* 1.077* 1.076* 
 (0.554) (0.551) (0.591) (0.592) 
Total trade associations' size / 1000  0.061*** 0.053** 0.045 
  (0.023) (0.024) (0.148) 
Trade association heterogeneity   1.024*** 0.965*** 
   (0.353) (0.370) 
Trade association heterogeneity X 
Trade associations' size    0.113** 
    (0.052) 
Wald chi squared 52699.72*** 47417.43*** 75636.24*** 84864.84*** 
Robust standard errors in 
parentheses         
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
† Estimates of significance are not shown for the time-period dummies because those 
coefficients are not tested for significance. 
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Table 10 
Piecewise Exponential Model of Recombinatorial-Technology Biodiesel Founding 
Events by State-Year 
 
          
Variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
1990-1994† -32.735 -29.681 -28.417 -28.415 
 (1.895) (2.183) (2.877) (2.966) 
1995-1999 -14.295 -12.401 -13.250 -13.253 
 (2.440) (2.670) (3.194) (3.322) 
2000-2004 -10.287 -8.3223 -9.432 -9.435 
 (3.269) (3.543) (4.063) (4.158) 
2005-2008 -6.929 -4.948 -6.007 -6.012 
 (3.658) (3.927) (4.531) (4.648) 
Population density -0.000 -0.000 0.000 0.000 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Gross state product (in millions) 0.007 -0.063 0.217 0.219 
 (0.350) (0.356) (0.404) (0.413) 
Available raw materials (logged) 0.280** 0.172 0.181 0.182 
 (0.118) (0.137) (0.163) (0.172) 
Raw material heterogeneity -0.452 -0.194 0.322 0.318 
 (0.933) (0.897) (1.026) (1.029) 
Farmland density -0.492 -0.660 -0.523 -0.523 
 (0.570) (0.592) (0.692) (0.691) 
Chemical engineers / 100,000 -2.431*** -2.805*** -3.410*** -3.423*** 
 (0.915) (0.863) (0.974) (1.019) 
Industry age -0.519** -0.523** -0.503* -0.503* 
 (0.238) (0.234) (0.259) (0.259) 
State diesel consumption (millions of 
barrels/year) 0.011 0.014* 0.014* 0.014* 
 (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) 
Biodiesel profitability (cents) -0.012*** -0.013*** -0.012** -0.012** 
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 
Biodiesel density 0.256** 0.259** 0.230** 0.230** 
 (0.110) (0.110) (0.105) (0.105) 
Surrounding state biodiesel density 0.070** 0.076** 0.093*** 0.094** 
 (0.032) (0.031) (0.035) (0.039) 
State biodiesel production incentive 
laws 0.267 0.253 0.226 0.228 
 (0.204) (0.209) (0.210) (0.209) 
State biodiesel production mandate 
laws 0.529 0.410 0.496 0.494 
 (0.374) (0.414) (0.375) (0.380) 
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Table 10 (Continued) 
 
Surrounding state biodiesel 
production incentive laws 0.628 0.695* 0.612 0.614 
 (0.402) (0.418) (0.422) (0.428) 
Surrounding state biodiesel 
production mandate laws 0.622 0.474 0.641 0.647 
 (0.631) (0.679) (0.738) (0.782) 
Federal subsidy 2.466* 2.395* 2.057 2.058 
 (1.370) (1.354) (1.392) (1.394) 
Total trade associations' size / 
1000  0.076* 0.072 0.034 
  (0.042) (0.045) (0.205) 
Trade association 
heterogeneity   1.179** 1.169* 
   (0.543) (0.609) 
Trade association 
heterogeneity X Trade 
associations' size    0.163* 
    (0.087) 
Wald chi squared 50832.62*** 45628.14*** 45872.51*** 58000.55*** 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
† Estimates of significance are not shown for the time-period dummies because those 
coefficients are not tested for significance. 
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Table 11 
General Least Squares Analysis of Technological Diversity of Biodiesel Foundings by 
State-Year 
  
Variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Population density 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Gross state product (in millions) 0.270*** 0.241*** 0.323*** 0.262*** 
 (0.072) (0.072) (0.078) (0.082) 
Available raw materials (logged) 0.002 -0.004 -0.015** -0.017** 
 (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) 
Raw material heterogeneity -0.066 -0.013 0.114 0.122 
 (0.062) (0.067) (0.075) (0.076) 
Farmland density -0.073 -0.199* -0.231* -0.207* 
 (0.088) (0.113) (0.122) (0.118) 
Chemical engineers / 100,000 -0.439*** -0.434*** -0.384*** 
-
0.489*** 
 (0.102) (0.103) (0.107) (0.119) 
Industry age 0.001 -0.001 -0.005 -0.004 
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.006) 
State diesel consumption (millions of 
barrels/year) 2.847*** 3.216*** 2.291** 3.299*** 
 (0.956) (0.974) (1.043) (1.122) 
Biodiesel profitability (cents) -0.001** -0.001** -0.000 -0.000 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Biodiesel density 0.059*** 0.067*** 0.055*** 0.056*** 
 (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) 
Surrounding state biodiesel density 0.016*** 0.016*** 0.025*** 0.019*** 
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 
State biodiesel production incentive laws 0.032 0.030 -0.013 -0.018 
 (0.029) (0.030) (0.030) (0.029) 
State biodiesel production mandate laws -0.105** -0.135*** -0.099* -0.090* 
 (0.046) (0.052) (0.052) (0.049) 
Surrounding state biodiesel production 
incentive laws 0.177*** 0.174*** 0.102* 0.083 
 (0.058) (0.059) (0.060) (0.060) 
Surrounding state biodiesel production 
mandate laws 0.283** 0.234* 0.282** 0.265** 
 (0.131) (0.130) (0.119) (0.114) 
Federal subsidy 0.055 0.059 0.070* 0.081* 
 (0.037) (0.038) (0.042) (0.043) 
Total trade associations' membership / 
100,000  0.739* 0.677 0.126*** 
  (0.400) (0.420) (0.038) 
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Table 11 (Continued) 
 
 
Trade association heterogeneity   0.226*** 0.293*** 
   (0.062) (0.062) 
Trade association heterogeneity * Trade 
associations' size    1.630* 
    (0.841) 
Constant -0.123 -0.008 0.132 0.145 
 (0.123) (0.134) (0.148) (0.150) 
Wald chi squared 333.64*** 332.98*** 356.18*** 359.05*** 
Standard errors in parentheses     
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%   
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 Moreover, model 4 in table 9 and model 8 in table 10 demonstrate that institutional 
actor strength, or the sum of total number of association members promoting 
competing technologies, positively moderates the effect of trade association 
heterogeneity on foundings and generation of recombinatory technologies, thereby 
supporting hypotheses 3 and 6.   
Moving to the measures of actor heterogeneity and interactions on 
technological variation in table 11, the first model contains the control variables; the 
second model adds trade association strength as measured by total membership of 
those promoting biodiesel; the third model adds the impact of opposition actors on 
technological variation; and the fourth model adds the interaction of trade association 
strength (membership) with trade association heterogeneity. Several of the control 
variables significantly affected technological variation. Gross state product, state 
diesel consumption, biodiesel density, surrounding state biodiesel density and 
surrounding state biodiesel production mandate laws all had positive effects on 
technological variation while the number chemical engineers, and state biodiesel 
production mandate laws seemed to decrease technological variation. Organizational 
ecologists assert that greater competition lends to resource partitioning wherein niche 
players emerge to capture resources not absorbed by generalists (Freeman and 
Hannan, 1983). This may explain why greater competition (density in focal and 
surrounding states) leads to greater numbers of biodiesel producers utilizing different 
feedstock technologies. The negative effect of production mandate laws on 
technological variation suggests that state laws may have an effect of favoring one 
technology over others.  
The results support hypotheses 2 and 4. In model three, the results illustrate 
that greater heterogeneity among institutional actors promoting various prescriptions 
and information had a positive impact on technological diversity, thereby supporting 
 92 
 
hypothesis 2. Likewise, the results in model four show that greater institutional actor 
strength positively amplified the effects of institutional heterogeneity, thus lending 
support to hypothesis 4.   
Discussion 
In this paper, I examined how competing institutional actors can affect 
entrepreneurial activity and technological choice at the beginning of a new sector and 
technological lifecycle. The analyses showed that greater actor heterogeneity had a 
positive effect on entrepreneurial activity as well as technological variation and 
innovation and that its effect was amplified by the strength of the actors promoting 
prescriptions and information. By appealing to a broad set of values and resources, 
institutional actor variation spurred foundings of biodiesel ventures using multiple 
technological processes. A greater heterogeneity of institutional actors also increased 
the development of recombinatorial technologies among new ventures by providing 
entrepreneurs with a wide repertoire of technological values and information.  
This paper makes several theoretical contributions. First, this paper contributes 
to the nexus of institutional and entrepreneurship research by considering how actor 
heterogeneity can affect the emergence of new organizations and spur technological 
diversity and innovation. A number of studies have explored how actor strength can 
promote the adoption of a new practice or the founding of a new organizational form 
(Lounsbury, 2001; Schneiberg, King, and Smith, 2008; Sine and Lee, 2009), but none 
of them have investigated how actor variation can affect entrepreneurial activity. 
Interestingly, the results indicate that institutional actor heterogeneity or competition 
had a greater effect than the strength or net size of actors on founding rates, 
recombinatorial innovation, and technological diversity. Given the power that 
heterogeneity has in shaping new sector development and entrepreneurial activity, 
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scholars may want to pay greater attention to heterogeneity in future institutional and 
organizational studies.  
Second, this paper builds upon the technology entrepreneurship research which 
is concerned about how new technologies develop and evolve over time (Tushman and 
Anderson, 1986). While researchers acknowledge the influence of institutional 
pressures on innovation and variation, most of this work focuses on the effect of 
standards and dominant designs at the industry level (Anderson and Tushman, 1990; 
Garud and Kumaraswamy, 1995), and neglects other kinds of institutional pressures 
that may enable or constrain technological development at the firm level. Thus, prior 
studies largely focus on technological adoption and development after the inflection 
point of the technological s-curve, largely overlooking other factors that affect 
entrepreneurial decision-making in the early periods. Building on past research this 
paper finds that greater institutional actor competition can profoundly influence 
technological development and variation at the beginning of new sectors and 
technological lifecycles by stimulating new-venture technological innovation and 
variation.  
Third, this paper also contributes to the research on institutional actor 
collaborations and alliances (Lawrence, Hardy, and Phillips, 2002; Maguire, Hardy, 
and Lawrence, 2004). While the institutional actors in this study competed with each 
other regarding the kind of biodiesel technology they promoted, they also collaborated 
at times to move the sector forward by endorsing and becoming members of the 
biodiesel sector’s trade association, the National Biodiesel Board. The results suggest 
that for institutional-actor collaboration to have the greatest effect on new 
organizational development, influence among members must be nearly equal 
(maximum heterogeneity). While the strength or size of the collaboration does make a 
difference on impact, collaborations or alliances must make sure to strike the right 
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balance between heterogeneity and size in order to maximize the differences of 
information and characteristics among the organizational members.  
Finally, this paper empirically contributes to our understanding of trade 
associations. Trade associations are entities that arise after a new sector has been 
formed with the purpose of defending and promoting the interests of their business 
firms (Aldrich and Staber, 1988). In the fight to represent their members’ political and 
economic preferences, organizational researchers have traditionally cast trade 
associations as opponents of innovation and institutional change that rely upon 
member and lobbying influence to squash emergence of new organizations (Aldrich, 
Zimmer, Staber, and Beggs, 1994; Sine, Haveman, and Tolbert, 2005). In contrast to 
previous studies, this paper finds that trade associations can actually be antecedents to 
and catalysts of new sectors and technologies by promoting prescriptions and scripts 
outside of their domain that change individuals’ perceptions of organizations and 
technologies. Thus, instead of just representing and defending existing business 
sectors, trade associations can actually create new ones. 
This paper is not without its limitations. For example, I do not investigate how 
actor competition or heterogeneity may affect subsequent new-venture survival and 
performance. It is possible that greater actor variation may be positively correlated 
with startup survival and performance because various actors can provide 
entrepreneurs with a wide variety of choices to choose from which they can optimize 
or combine, thereby picking or developing the right technology for them and their 
environment. On the other hand, actor diversity may have a negative impact on new-
venture survival later because greater fragmentation among trade associations may 
dilute individual actor power and increase influence costs, making it more difficult for 
an individual actor to lobby for regulation that can benefit the promoted technology or 
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practice (Rao, Morrill, and Zald, 2000). Research on the temporal effects of variation 
on new-venture survival is warranted. 
Additionally, it is possible that too many actors promoting varying 
prescriptions and information may dampen entrepreneurial activity by undermining 
sector legitimacy and confusing entrepreneurs. For example, Meyer and Scott (1983) 
asserted that the legitimacy of an organizational form, arrangement or promoted 
concept is “negatively affected by the number of different authorities…and by the 
diversity or inconsistency of their accounts” (202). Likewise, research in social 
psychology suggests that having too many choices may have a negative effect because 
as options increase, the effort and time needed to process the available information 
may cause entrepreneurs to simply defer decisions, search for new alternatives, or 
simply decline to decide (Iyengar and Lepper, 2000; Iyengar, Huberman, and Jiang, 
2004). Research that evaluates the possible negative consequences of too much actor 
heterogeneity on entrepreneurial activity and technological development is needed.  
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